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FOREWORD
The papers presented during the 1949 sessions of the
Third Natural Law Institute of the University of Notre
Dame and reprinted in this volume have brilliantly
maintained the high standards of exacting scholarship
set by the preceding sessions of 1947 and 1948. They
deal with the impact of the Natural Law on four great
bodies of positive law. The Common Law, the Canon
Law, Constitutional Law and International Law are not
rubrics in some dim Code of by-gone days. They constitute major portions of human law today, the present
and future development of which is of immediate concern to us all, lawyer and layman alike. The scholars
whose papers appear herein show us how Natural Law
lies deep at the roots of all four of these great bodies of
law, how from it all four have drawn such nourishment
that even today in their present stage of advanced development, it is difficult to trace back their characteristic
rules without finding Natural Law originally informing
them and indeed providing them with a vital principle
of growth. It is not impertinent to ask whether the
present and future will see that growth continued. Will
it be warped and distorted by new and alien principles?
In the light of such questions the papers of the 1949
sessions, while indeed looking back over the past, necessarily compel us to look forward. This is not the least
of their distinctions.
These papers, moreover, again bring home to unpreju-
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diced minds a point of cardinal importance. The Natural Law is not some esoteric tenet of Roman Catholic
theology or even of Christian philosophy. The participants in the various sessions of the Institute have been
men of various religious beliefs. Nevertheless their profound studies and their quiet reflections brought them
to the Natural Law Institute of Notre Dame united in
a common conviction that the Natural Law lies beyond
particular credal differences. It is the great and unique
possession of Man as the Child of God. The careful
reader will not miss then the subtle harmony which runs
through all the papers of this volume. Recognition of
the Natural Law and its principles can alone bring about
the realization and the proper understanding of the great
ideal of the brotherhood of Man under God which a
terrified world is learning to see once more, albeit still
"through a glass in an obscure manner," as its last hope.
REV. JOHN J.

CAVANAUGH,

President of the University
of Notre Dame

C(.S.C.,

INVOCATION

(Cablegram from His Holiness Pope Pius XII
to the 1949 Institute)

VATICAN CITY,
December 7, 1949
Very Reverend John J. Cavanaugh, c.s.c.,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
The Holy Father on the occasion of the annual reunion of the Natural Law Institute of Notre Dame University cordially imparts to all participating Paternal
Apostolic Blessing in pledge of divine enlightenment in
the Institute's deliberations.
(Signed) Montini, Substitute.
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INTRODUCTION
Men have invoked the Natural Law for more than
twenty-two hundred years. Expressions of the concept
have varied in detail. There is, nevertheless, a central
core of meaning common to them all. The State is not
the sole source of human rights and duties. Above it
there abides an vbjective norm, unchanging and unchangeable, by which the moral integrity of man-made
laws can and must be measured. Hebrew prophet,
Greek philosopher and Roman jurist long ago envisioned
such a higher law. The Christian Era saw its meaning
deepened and its sanctions made complete.
In the beginning, God, acting with Supreme Intelligence, created all things according to a Divine Plan.
That Plan is the Eternal Law. Man, endowed by his
Creator with an immortal soul, an intellect and a free
will, can ascertain the primary dictates of the Eternal
Law by his own reason, apart from direct Revelation.
Such dictates thus made known, together with the inferences flowing rationally from them, constitute the Natural Law. To his Creator, Man as a creature owes primary duties. Correlative to such duties he has certain
rights, "unalienable" and beyond human power to impair
or to destroy. The laws then which men make for men
in civil society will express and supplement the Natural
Law.
Knowing therefore no limitations of time or space, no
boundaries based on color, race or creed, the Natural
I
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Law is the God-given birthright of all men, everywhere,
forever. From it the Spanish Catholics, Vitoria the
Dominican and Suarez the Jesuit, drew the first principles upon which the Dutch Protestant, Grotius later
built a modem Law of Nations. English lawyers in their
contest with would-be despots appealed to the Natural
Law. Following in the same tradition, American lawyers
wove its doctrines into the texture of the Declaration
of Independence, and for generations American law students began their studies with acknowledgment of the
Eternal Law and the Natural Law as valid criteria of
human laws. Such doctrines vanished from most American law schools in more recent days of Secularism,
Pragmatism and Subjectivism. Jurisprudence, anciently
acclaimed as the science "of things divine and human,
of the just and the unjust," was ejected from its broad
domain and narrowly confined to the historical or
analytical study of man-made laws alone. It had no
armor to offer Man in the hour of his great crisis when
the Totalitarian State arose.
With the future of the Atomic Age rushing swiftly
toward him, Man once again faces the concept of a
State claiming unlimited power over the human personality and refusing recognition to rights and duties not
created by itself. To meet the "Absolute" of the State,
Man has desperate need of an "Absolute" of his own.
Such an Absolute the thinkers of over twenty-two centuries found in the Natural Law. Is that doctrine the
answer to Man's need today? To that question the Natural Law Institute of the College of Law of the Univer-
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sity of Notre Dame dedicates itself. Humbly conscious
of the noble tradition it thus carries on and fully aware
of the high responsibilities entailed, the Institute invites
and welcomes to participation in its undertakings, jurists
and legislators, judges and lawyers, men everywhere who
are concerned with human law, its nature, scope and
limitations.
The Natural Law Institute, established in 1947 has
then as its objects the examination of the history of the
Natural Law doctrine, the clarification of its true basis
and its adequate restatement in the light of modem
problems. Sessions of the Institute are held each year
and the proceedings are published in annual volumes of
which the present volume is the Third.
The 1947 sessions were devoted to an exposition of
the broad philosophical implications of the Natural Law
doctrine. In 1948 the theme was the historical development of the doctrine. In 1949 four distinguished authorities discussed the relations between the Natural Law
and four great departments of positive law -the Common Law, Canon Law, Constitutional Law and International Law.
The unusually large attendance at the various sessions
of the 1949 Institute and the widespread interest in the
Institute's objectives indicated that the Natural Law
doctrine can no longer be regarded as something of historical interest only. As Mr. Arthur Krock, writing in
the New York Times, November 29, 1949, declared:
In the clashing succession of violent events these
days, the discussion to be resumed by the Institute
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at Notre Dame may seem dull, philosophical hairsplitting, and equally unimportant. But the growth
of state controls of man all over the world, including the United States, and his acceptance of the
legalism which enforces them, compose an acute,
present-day problem for all who are governed.
At the conclusion of the 1949 sessions the University
announced the establishment of a Natural Law Library,
the generous gift of Mr. Alvin A. Gould, sponsor of the
1948 and 1949 sessions of the Institute. The Library, an
outgrowth of the work already undertaken at the College
of Law, is designed to bring together in one place, readily accessible to scholars, the most comprehensive collection of books and materials on the Natural Law. A description of the Library is included in an appendix to
this volume.
The Editor wishes to express deep appreciation to the
Reverend John J. Cavanaugh, c.s.c., President of the
University of Notre Dame, to Dean Clarence E. Manion
of the College of Law, to Mr. Alvin A. Gould, sponsor
of the Institute's sessions, to Mr. Frank A. Peluso, Student Chairman, to the faculty and student body of the
College of Law and to the many, many others whose
untiring efforts made possible the success of the 1949
meeting.
EDWARD

F.

BARRETT,

Associate Professor of Law,
University of Notre Dame,
Editor.

WILLIAM A. CASTELLINI
(1900-1950)
The University of Notre Dame in general and the Natural Law Institute of the
College of Law in particular, note with
deep regret the passing of Mr. William A.
Castellini, Class of 1922. Mr. Castellini's
sincere interest in the objectives of the
Natural Law Institute and his untiring
efforts in securing its successful establishment earned him the right to be called
one of its founders. Although he has been
taken from us, his inspiration will remain
always. May he rest in peace.

NATURAL LAW AND THE COMMON LAW

Richard O'Sullivan, K.C.
(Master of the Bench, Middle Temple, London, since 1940;
K.C., 1934; Member of the General Council of the Bar since
1939; Chairman, Regional Advisory and Home Office Advisory Committee, 1939-1945; Recorder of Derby, since 1938;
Lecturer in Common Law at University College, and at the
Inns of Court, London; Honorary Secretary of the Thomas
More Society, London.)

THE NATURAL LAW AND THE COMMON LAW

THE

Common Law of England and the United States

isthe only great system of temporal law that came out
of the Christian centuries. It came out of the centuries
which gave us the great English Cathedrals and Abbeys
and the old Universities and the lovely parish churches
of the English country-side.
The 11 th and 12th centuries were throughout Europe
a period of active renaissance in legal studies. The first
waves of influence of this renaissance reached England
with Lanfranc, the lawyer of Pavia, master of Roman
Civil and Roman Canon Law, who in England was to
carry all before him even when the talk was of sac
and soc.
In the Anglo-Saxon time England had established a
Christian tradition in law and letters. "English law,"
says Maitland, "has no written memorials of its heathenry. Every trace but the very faintest of the old religion
has been carefully expurgated from all that is written:
for all that is written passes through ecclesiastical hands."
In the legislation of Ethelbert and Ine and Alfred and
Cnut there is no trace of the laws and jurisprudence of
Imperial Rome as distinct from the precepts and traditions of the Church. "And this inroad," says the historian, "of the Roman ecclesiastical tradition, of the
system which in the course of time was organized in the
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Canon Law, was the first and by no means the least
important of the Norman invasions of our polity."
Even so, in the century immediately preceding the
Conquest, the social and religious condition of England
was backward and in some ways retrogressive. The
manumissions which are found among the Anglo-Saxon
Charters show the existence of slaves all through the
period. The slave trade was active, the main routes
being to Ireland and to Gaul. (The name of Patrick
carries its own memories.) In the reign of Ethelred, the
Archbishop of York denounced the practice in his homilies. Towards the end of the 1lth century Wulfstan,
Bishop of Worcester, who held his place right through
the Conquest, protested vigorously against the slave trade
that was carried on from Bristol. "The central force of
old English social development," says Professor Stenton,
"may be described as the process by which a peasantry
composed of essentially free men, acknowledging no law
below the king, gradually lost economic and personal
independence." Thus it was that the Conqueror left
Normandy, where there were few slaves, for a land
where there were many; "where the slave was still a
vendible chattel and the slave trade was flagrant."
And so, immediately after the Conquest, the mass of
the English folk who cultivated the soil were slaves or
serfs or villeins or otherwise of unfree condition. The
Domesday Inquest asks: "How many villeins? How
many slaves? How many free men? How many soke
men." And so on. The slave class, which was composed
of men and women who were slaves by birth, or of those
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who in evil days had bowed their heads for bread, tended
in the course of time to become merged in the miscellaneous class of persons who actually cultivated the soil.
The cowherd, the ploughman, the cottar and their progeny were often serfs attached to the soil and sold with
the soil; they were the most valuable part of the stock
of the farm and their pedigrees were carefully kept.
The condition of the Church also, in the century before the Conquest, was in many ways unsatisfactory. The
bishops were mostly uneducated and secularized: ecclesiastical synods and ecclesiastical law were falling into disuse; there was no separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
The spiritual and intellectual renaissance that came
with the Conquest effected a rapid reform. The legislation of William went straight to the sources of life, and
of more abundant life. Even before he demanded the
personal oath and loyalty of all free men the Conqueror
proclaimed that "one God shall be honoured throughout
the whole of the kingdom and the Christian faith shall
be kept inviolate." Again, in 1066, the Charter he gave
to the City of London recognized the family, and freedom
of inheritance: "I will that every child shall be his
father's heir after his father's day." A man is free and
knows himself to be free to the extent to which his inheritance is inviolable. It is a mark of tyranny (not
unknown in our own time) to thrust men out of their
inheritance.
The Episcopal laws of the Conqueror direct that "no
bishop shall henceforth hold pleas in the Hundred Court,
nor shall they bring forward for the judgment of laymen
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any case which concerns the spiritual jurisdiction." This
separate organization of temporal and spiritual courts
is a distinctly Christian thing. In pre-Christian civilization there was no distinction between Church and State.
Religion was an affair of groups rather than of individuals. The parallel organization in England of King's
Courts and Courts Christian involves the recognition of
the great Christian principle (which today is everywhere under challenge) that the moral and spiritual
life of man must be beyond the power and reach of the
political officers of the community. The words that
John and Peter spoke in the Acts of the Apostles,
"whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto
you rather than unto God, judge ye" mark a revolution
in the attitude of the individual citizen to society: the
claim that man is answerable in his own mind and conscience to a Power and an Authority higher than the
State. The individual moral and religious experience
transcends the authority of the political society, and the
Church, as embodying this spiritual experience, cannot
tolerate the control of the State. In the years to come,
after the bitter quarrel between Henry II and Thomas
Becket, the first clause of the Magna Carta will consecrate the doctrine: That the Church in England shall
be free and have all its laws in their integrity and all its
privileges unimpaired.
England under the Norman and Angevin kings was in
close touch with the now vivid, intellectual life of Europe.
Already in 1118 the author of the Leges Henrici I endeavours in a rational, and even in a philosophical form,
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to restate the medley of customs of Mercia and Wessex
and East Anglia that make up the law of the land after
the amendment by William I and by Henry I of the supposed laws of Edward the Confessor. He finds in the
writings of Isidore of Seville and of the Canonist Burchard of Worms a source of general jurisprudence. The
works of Burchard and of Isidore restate the teaching on
Natural Law of Aristotle and of Cicero. They will be
among the sources from which in the years to come the
Common Law will draw its proper doctrine.
Henry II had not yet come to the throne when the
Decretum of Gratian, the first great text-book of the
Canon Law, was published. It opens with a definition of
law and of natural law. "The race of mankind," says
Gratian, "is ruled by two things, by natural law and
custom." We are at a turning-point in the history of
the law of the church; it is also a turning point in the
history of English law.
In the reign of Henry II, law and literature grew up
together. At the Court of Theobald of Canterbury is
Bartholomew of Exeter, canonist and theologian from
the schools of Paris, and John of Salisbury, who has
served for some time in the Papal Chancery, and will
have stern words to say to kings and tyrants. In the
Polycraticus he affirms the existence and operation everywhere of a system of natural law, and declares that
human law must not be at variance with it. If human
law contradicts the natural law it is invalid and not to
be enforced. At Canterbury also was Vacarius, the first
professor of Roman Civil Law in England. Before the
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end of the century Richard Bishop of London in the
Dialogus de Scaccario and Hubert Walter, afterwards
Archbishop of Canterbury, in the book that is called
Glanvil, raised English law to the level of literature.
Glanvil, newly edited for us by Professor Woodbine of
Yale, is the first great text-book of the Common Law,
which owes its beginnings to the reorganization of the
Curia and the Kings Courts in the reign of Henry II.
With the ratio scripta of the Roman Civil Law and
the Decretum before their eyes, the early common
lawyers deliberately chose, on the basis of natural law
and on principles of Christian freedom, to frame a new
system of writs that would run in the King's name
everywhere, and in time to come in the name of kingless
commonwealths on the other shore of the Atlantic
Ocean; and round these writs would grow an organic
system of unwritten law that would be the common law
of England. In face of the written law of Imperial and
of Papal Rome, the man who wrote Glanvil, whom we
take to be Hubert Walter and, after him, Henry of
Bracton are at pains to argue that it is not absurd to
call the laws and customs of England, though they are
not written, by the name of law. It was for the good
of the whole world, says Maitland, that one race stood
apart from its neighbours, turned away its eyes at an
early time, from the fascinating pages of the Corpus
Juris, and made the grand experiment of a new system
of writs and formulas.
Soon after the middle of the twelfth century, the Assize
of Clarendon and the Assize of Northampton introduce
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a Christian idea, derived from natural law, which becomes one of the leading conceptions of the Common
Law. It is the conception of the liber et legalis homo:
the free and lawful man. In the writs that we read in
Glanvil and at a later time in Bracton, the Sheriff is
regularly ordered to summon so many free and lawful
men to determine a matter of fact in dispute between the
parties. "Among laymen," says Maitland, "the time has
already come when men of one sort, free and lawful
men, can be treated as men of the common, the ordinary,
we may perhaps say the normal sort, while men of all
other sorts enjoy privileges and are subject to disabilities
which can be called exceptional. The lay Englishman,
free but not noble, who is of full age and, who has forfeited none of his rights by crime or sin, is the law's
typical man, typical person."
In the presence of this noble conception of man, slavery
ceases. At the end of the twelfth century anything that
could be called slavery was extinct.
Just at this time too, an English Pope, Adrian IV, in
a Decretal Letter, laid down for all Christendom the
rule that "as in Jesus Christ there is neither free nor
slave and the Sacraments are open to all, so also the
marriage of slaves must not be prohibited; and even if
the contract is made without the consent of the master
(so as to be invalid according to the Roman Civil Law)
the marriage is not to be dissolved or declared void in
the Ecclesiastical Court." The Decretum of Gratian too
includes a Canon which forbids the dissolution of the
marriage of slaves; on the ground that, as God is the
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father of all men, in things related to God the same law
is binding upon all men.
At the end of the twelfth century the course of the
Common Law is already set towards the making of a
society of free and responsible men and women united in
obedience to one law in the fellowship of a free community. The King will be below the law. The design is
clear in Magna Carta of which Archbishop Stephen
Langton was the architect and the common lawyers of
the school of Glanvil were the clerks of works. The most
famous words of the Charter embody the formula of
Novel Disseisin. "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his free tenement ...

or outlawed or

exiled or in any wise destroyed nor will we go upon him
nor will we send upon him unless by the lawful judgment
of his peers, and by the law of the land."
Like John of Salisbury, Stephen Langton affirmed the
rule of natural law, that it is binding on Princes and
Bishops alike, that there is no escape from it, that it is
beyond the reach of the Pope himself, who could not dispense from it, seeing that the fabric of any form of society is bound up with it. In our constitutional history,
Stephen Langton, a real English Prelate, troublesome
alike to Pope and King, rightly takes his place alongside
the great common lawyers; or Somers; or Burke.'
In the year in which the Charter was wrung from
John, the Fourth Lateran Council was held. The Decrees
of the Council had many repercussions in the Common
I As the author of what is perhaps the greatest of the Christian hymns-the Veni Sancte Spiritus-he has a place apart.
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Law, 2 on the constitutional theory, for example, of repre-

sentation and consent. "The theory of representation
and the doctrine of consent are traced to an ecclesiastical
origin by attributing to the Lateran Council of 1215 the
motive source, to the practice of the English Church
Councils from 1226 onward the precedents, and to ecclesiastical leaders the principle applied first in connection
with taxes on Spiritualities that taxation demands both
representation and consent. It is now shown that the
feudal doctrine of consent to taxation lacked the element
of representation. The Church affirming this principle
quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur linked the
two practices together and so laid the foundation of the
power of the Commons. Even more important was the
contribution of the leaders of the Church of England,
both in principle and in practice to the union of the
different estates of the realm into one single communitas
3
regni.
Another decree of the Lateran Council imposed on individual Christians everywhere the duty of confessing
their sins at least once a year and of receiving the
Eucharist during the Easter time. The opening words
of the Decree Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis are an enfranchisement to the mind.
Of the same tenor is a Proclamation issued by Hubert
Walter in the year 1195, Quod omnes homines regni
Angliae pro posse suo servabunt. Such decrees and proc2 The abolition of the Ordeal caused a serious crisis in the King's Courts
and on the Circuits, and hastened the advent of trial by jury.

8 May's Parliamentary Practice, 1946 ed., p. 7.
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lamations deepening the Christian sense of equality
tended in course of time to annihilate the distinction
that was still retained in Magna Carta, the distinction
between the free man and the unfree man or villein,
between omnis liber homo and omnis homo.
In the legislation of the 13th and 14th centuries the
distinction disappears. The Statute of Winchester of
Edward I lays upon every man, rich or poor alike, active
duties of citizenship. Every good citizen must assist the
forces of order and of government. A Statute of 5 Edward III enacts that "no man shall be attached by any
accusation nor forejudged of life or limb, nor his lands,
tenements, goods or chattels seized into the King's hands
against the form of the Great Charter and the law of
the land." Another Statute of 28 Edward III declares
that "no man, of what estate or condition that he be,
shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken nor
imprisoned nor disinherited, nor put to death, without
being brought in answer by due process of law."
Coke was thus able in his day to assert that Clause 39
of the Charter (which affords protection to free men)
extended also to villeins, for villeins were free against
all men, save only against their lord. Even against their
lord the law protected them always in life and limb.
Though the villein was not 'at common law,' he was a
persona. He had a spiritual life of his own, and was
responsible before the doomsmen of the manorial court.
He managed his own affairs. The lord was not answerable for his acts or his defaults; and though the lord
might give him orders he was bound to obey only such
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orders as were 'licita et honesta.' In due time the King's
Courts granted the villein a writ of trespass against his
lord. And without the assistance of any Statute villeinage
withered away and came to an end. The villein had come
to be a free and lawful man. Out of slave and serf and
villein the common law had created the copyholder and
the yeoman.
Animated by this spirit of equality and freedom, the
king's judges of the Central and Circuit Courts declared
and administered the new and growing body of rational
principles of the common law as opposed to the special
customs and privileges of the Counties and Boroughs.
As the King's Court organized itself, "slowly but surely
justice done in the King's name by men who are the
king's servants, becomes the most important kind of justice, reaches out into the remotest comers of the land,
grasps the small affairs of small folk, as well as the great
affairs of earls and barons. Above all local custom rose
the custom of the King's Court: tremendurn regiae
majestatis imperium."
The earliest Judges of the Common Law were Clerks
and Laymen who were appointed to hear all the complaints of the kingdom and to do justice and right: Ut
audirent omnes regni et rectum facerent. Acting with
youthful vigor and a bold simplicity, and unhampered as
they were by precedent, these men and their successors,
among them Glanvil and Hubert Walter, laid the deep
foundations of the Common Law. They were Christian
men, - Ranulf Glanvil died on the Crusade and Hubert
Walter became Archbishop of Canterbury - and they
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were guided by the principles of Christian ethics and
of natural law.
In the outlook of these men, and of men like Martin
Patteshull and William Raleigh at a later day, there is
a certain Christian sense of classlessness:
"For all we are Christ's creatures. And of
His coffers rich.
And brethren of one blood.
gars and earls."

Alike beg-

Beggars and earls - and kings also. "The medieval
king," says Maitland, "was every inch a king, but just
for this reason he was every inch a man and you did not
talk nonsense about him. . . . If you said that he was
Christ's Vicar, you meant what you said, and you might
add that he would become the servant of the devil if he
declined toward tyranny. In all that I have read I have
seen very little said of him that was not meant strictly
and literally true of a man, of an Edward or a Henry." 4
In the preamble to Magna Carta, King John confesses that the Charter is made and granted for the
honour of God, the exaltation of Holy Church, the
amendment of the kingdom, and the good of the king's
soul.
And here we may recall that the ordinary man of the
law, "the free and lawful man" is a layman who is of
full age and who has forfeited none of his rights by
crime or sin. The ordinary man of the law is related
directly to the Church and to the State. The Common
4 Law Quarterly Review,

XVII, 132.
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Law takes for granted the organization of Church and
State as distinct and coordinate powers. According to
the common Christian teaching (as Fortescue will explain to the prince in the early chapters of the De Laudibus) law is ineffective without grace. It is the lesson of
Aquinas in the Introduction to his Treatise on Law:
that God, who is the external principle moving us to
good action, instructs our mind by law and assists our will
by grace. The Pdagianism of the modem secular state
with its multiplicity of laws and regulations will not
suffice.
It is a characteristic of the Common Law that the law
for great men shall become the law for all men. The law of
Baron and Feme, for example, will come to be the law
of husband and wife. Again, the Peace of Our Lord the
King will be matched in every homestead in the land.
"The house of Everyman is to him as his castle and fortress as well for defence against injury as for his repose...
domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium. The privities of husband and wife are not to be known." "The
land of Everyman is in contemplation of law enclosed
from others though it lie in the open field and therefore
if a man do trespass, the writ of trespass shall be quare
clausum Iregit." Within the homestead, the father will
bear the rule of the family and the education of the
children and the management of his own property and
the administration of his own affairs. All will be in accordance with the principles of the natural law.
"The greatest and most lasting triumph of the Norman
and Angevin kings," says Maitland, "was to make the
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prelates of the Church their Justices: Let us imagine a
man whose notion of the law and the logic of law is that
displayed in the Leges Henrici I coming upon a glossed
version of the Decretum or on the Summa, say of William of Longchamp. His whole conception of what a
lawbook, what a judgment should be, of how men should
state law and argue about law, must undergo a radical
change. The effect produced on English law by its contact with the Romano-Canonical learning, seems immeasurable or measurable only by the distance that divides
Glanvil's treatise from the Laws of Henry I (the distance, we are told elsewhere, between reason and unreason; between logic and caprice). "During the whole
of the 12th and 13th centuries, English law was administered by the ablest, the best educated men in the realm:
by the self-same men who were the Judges Ordinary
of the Courts Christian. At one moment Henry III had
three Bishops for his Arch-Justiciars. In Richard's reign
we can see the King's Court as it sits day by day. It is
often enough composed of the Archbishop of Canterbury, two other Bishops, two or three Archdeacons, two
or three ordained clerks, and two or three laymen. The
majority of its members might at any time be called
upon to hear ecclesiastical causes and learn the lessons
in law that were addressed to them in Papal Rescripts.
Blackstone's picture of a nation divided into two parties
'the bishops and clergy' on one side contending for their
foreign jurisprudence, 'the nobility and the laity' on the
other side adhering 'with equal pertinacity' to the old
Common Law is not true. It is by popish clergymen that
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our old Common Law is converted from a rude mass of
customs into an articulate system, and when the popish
clergymen, yielding at length to the Pope's commands,
no longer sit as the principal justices of the King's
Court, the creative age of our medieval law is over." 5 At
the beginning of the reign of Edward I the main outlines
of the medieval common law will have been drawn for
good. The subsequent centuries will be able to do little
more than fill in the details of a scheme which is set
before them as unalterable. English Law during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is likewise continuously developed from its medieval principles.
Even when the popish clergymen yield at length to the
Pope's commands, one of them, Henry of Bracton bequeathed to the world a book De Legibus Et Consuetudinibus Angliae which was destined to be the text-book of
the Common Law until Blackstone wrote his Commentaries after a lapse of five whole centuries.
Conscious of the danger that threatened through the
appointment to the Chair of Justice of unlettered and
ignorant men who were apt, in deciding cases, to follow
their fancy rather than the authority of law, Bracton
undertook a scrutiny of old decisions given by his predecessors on the Bench, and in particular his immediate
masters Martin Patteshull and William Raleigh, and
extracted and set in order the rules of the law that were
illustrated by the old authorities.
In the introduction to his work (of which we owe the
5 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, I. 132-3.
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text again to the life-long labors of Professor Woodbine
of Yale) Bracton, "a man of genius as a lawyer and of
talent as a Latinist" elaborates the living principles of
English medieval jurisprudence, of which his book has
been called the crown and flower. He seeks his source
in the Old and the New Testament, in the Councils and
the Fathers of the Church, in the Decretum of Gratian
and the Decretals of Gregory IX. Though he is said to
be neither a legist nor a canonist, he had a current knowledge of Roman Civil and of Canon Law. He is
familiar with the works of Azo of Bologna, and of John
of Salisbury, from whom he borrows a characteristic passage on tyranny. He uses the writings of the Canonists,
Tancred and John the Teuton and Raymond of Pennafort. (John the Teuton, author of the Glossa Ordinaria,
was the link, so to say, in the discussions then in progress
between the Canonists and the Theologians on the topic
of natural law.) Raymond of Pennafort, sometime Master General of the Dominican Order, edited the Decretals
of Gregory IX and some years afterwards suggested to a
young Dominican from Aquino, the writing of the
Summa Contra Gentes. Bracton is thus brought very
close to his younger contemporary St. Thomas, whom
he predeceased by only five or six years. Had he lived
a little longer who can doubt that the great master of
the Common Law would have had in his hands the first
and most enduring Treatise on the Philosophy of Law
which forms part of the Summa Theologica. Who can
doubt that, within a little time after its first appearance,
the Treatise of Aquinas on Divine and Natural and
Human Law would find its way into the hands of English
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lawyers who were now being organised at the Inns of
Court and Chancery, as advocates and attorneys? That
it did so is to my mind clear from the textbooks and the
Year Books, from the writings of Fortescue and Littleton
and Thomas More and Christopher St. Germain.
On an early page of his work Bracton roundly condemns servitude and slavery, as institutions contrary to
the natural law. Servitude is summarily declared to be
contra naturam. "Est quidem servitus constitutio juris
gentium qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subjicitur." The Roman civil law and the Jus Gentium are
condemned for their attitude to slavery. In hac parte jus
civile vel gentium detrahit juri naturali. In this matter
the civil law of Rome and the jus gentium go contrary
to natural law. Manumission is rather the recognition
than the gift of freedom, for freedom, which is a thing
of natural law, could not be rightly taken away, though
by the jus gentium the principle was obscured (obfuscata). Jura enim naturalia sunt immutabilia. The law
of nature is immutable.
Bracton takes from Ulpian the definition of natural
law: jus naturaleest quod natura omnia animalia docuit;
and, by a simple amendment (following Azo of Bologna)
transforms its meaning: jus naturale est quod natura, id
est ipse Deus, omnia animalia docuit. And he proceeds to discuss infringements of natural law in terms
of moral theology. Though English law had received
the tradition of Aristotle and of Cicero and the classical jurists, the Christian understanding, in the light
of its proper conception of God and of creation, transforms the whole tradition and immediately carries the
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discussion to a higher plane. For all his beliefs in the
natural law, Aristotle was tolerant of slavery. Cicero,
too, was tolerant of slavery; and likewise the Roman
Civil Lawyers. All these men were tolerant of a great
many things that are also repugnant to the Christian
understanding of natural law. The god of Aristotle or of
Cicero or of the civilian lawyers of Imperial Rome, was
not the God of Hubert Walter or of Henry of Bracton.
The tolerances of the Roman Civil Law and of some
modem States that inherit the Civil Law tradition for
ideas and institutions that run contrary to Christian conceptions of natural law have never belonged to the native
tradition of the Common Law. From the beginning the
Common Law has been hostile not only to slavery and
such things as the practice of abortion but also to unnatural offences and the institution of the brothel or the
maison toleree.
And here we may remark that at the Council of
Merton, when Englishmen refused to accept the principle of legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium it was
no baron but a lawyer, an ecclesiastic, a judge, William
Raleigh, the master of Bracton, who stood up for
the English practice against the Roman Civil Law and
the Canons of the Church and the consensus of Christendom. The hostility of the common lawyers to the rule
of legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium is shown over
the period of centuries by Glanvil and Raleigh and
Bracton and Sir John Fortescue, who argues that bastards contract from their procreation a blemish (even
though latent in their minds) other than that contracted
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by legitimate issue, for it is the culpable and mutual lust
of their parents that contrives their engendering which
is not so in the lawful and chaste embraces of matrimony.
In the matter of freedom also, one may remark that
Bracton is far more forthright than his younger contemporary St. Thomas Aquinas, who seems to regard the
institution of slavery, as it appears in the jus gentium,
as a thing which natural reason instituted among men;
an institution appropriate not to the nature of man as
such but to the condition of this or that man to whom
it may be an advantage to be ruled by one more wise.
The aim of the Common Law, acting in consonance
with the principles of natural law, is to make free men
living in the fellowship of a free community. Bracton
will announce the great constitutional principle which
will sound through all the centuries and encircle the
world: "The King is under God and the law."
With this principle, which is implicit in Magna Carta,
Sir Edward Coke will meet the claim of the first Stuart
King to rule by divine right. With these words, the
President of a scarcely constitutional tribunal will condemn a second Stuart King to death. With these words,
another Stuart King will be admonished in the hour of
the Restoration. At Nuremberg Justice Robert Jackson
of the Supreme Court of the United States will invite an
International Tribunal to declare that not kings only,
but rulers also, are "under God and the law."
The King is under God and the law. Bracton states
the principle and finds his proof in the example of Our
Lord and of Our Lady.6 The King is under God and the
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law. He is under the law of God, he is under the natural law. The will of man cannot alter the nature of
things. Voluntas hominis non potest immutare naturam.
The rules of human law cannot derogate from the divine
or the natural law. There are superior rules of right
which guide and limit all human law and legislation. It
is teaching and the tradition of the Inns of Court.
The constitutional doctrine of Henry of Bracton was
accepted and reaffirmed by Sir John Fortescue, Chief
Justice, who lived and suffered during the Wars of the
Roses. The most popular of the works of Fortescue, the
De Laudibus Legum Angliae, gives a first sketch of the
system of education, that was followed at the Inns of
Court, which were, during all the centuries of the Middle Age, 'the University and Church Militant of the
Common Law.' In the interval between the 13th and
15th centuries, the Inns appear to have assimilated and
made their own the main doctrines of Aquinas in relation
to law and ethics and theology. Fortescue, who seems
never to have studied elsewhere than at the Inns of
Court, is entirely familiar with the political and legal
philosophy of St. Thomas. On the first page of his De
Monarchia, which is the first book on the English Constitution to be written in English, he borrows from Aqui6 'Et quod sub lege esse debeato, cum sit dei vicarius, evidenter apparet ad similitudinem Ihesu Christi, cuius vices gert in terris. Quia
verax dei misericordia, cum ad recuperandum humanum genus ineffabiliter
ei multa suppeterent, hanc potissimam elegit viam, qua ad destruendum
opus diaboli non virtute uteretur potentiae sed iustitiae ratione. Et sic
esse voluit sub lege, ut cos qui sub lege erant redimeret. Noluit enim uti
viribus, sed iudicio. Sic etiam beata dei genetrix, virgo Maria, mater
domini, quae singulari priveligio supra legem fuit pro ostendendo tamen
humilitatis exemplo legalibus subdi non refugit institutis. Sic ergo rex, ne
potestas sua maneat infrenata.' Bracton (ed. Woodbine) Vol. II, p. 33.
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nas the distinction between dominium regale and dominium politicum et regale, between absolute and limited
monarchy. "And thai diuersen in that the first kynge mey
rule his peple bi suche lawes as he makyth hym self.
And therefore he mey sett uppon thaim tayles and other
imposicions, such as he wol hym self, with owt thair
assent. The secounde kynge may not rule his peple bi
other lawes than such as thai assenten unto. And therefore he mey sett upon thaim non imposicions with owt
thair owne assent."
By contrast with the kingdom of France where the
King has absolute power, the kingdom of England is a
limited monarchy, dominium politicum et regale. The
day will come when a French King will assert: l'etat
c'est moi. The tradition of Roman Civil Law runs easily
to totalitarianism.
In addition to De Monarchia, Fortescue also wrote an
important work De Natura Legis Naturae in which he
makes extensive use of the writings of Aquinas and also
of Aristotle and Augustine. The natural law is for him
as it was for the general run of English lawyers at the
turn of the 16th Century mater et domina omnium
legum humanarum, the mother and the mistress of all
human laws. The stress which Sir John Fortescue laid
in all his writings upon the supreme importance of the
law of God and of the law of nature was a factor in the
transmission to modem times of the concept of a fundamental law to which all other laws must conform.
The precious little Dialogue of Faith and Understanding by Fortescue "bears witness to the vivid religion of
a busy man of affairs - the religion of a layman - which
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rings as true as the cloistered virtue of a'Kempis."
Like Fortescue, Thomas Littleton, the author of the
Tenures, "the most perfect and absolute work in any
human science," was also a deeply religious man. He was
a member of the famous Guild of the Holy Cross at
Stratford-on-Avon. (The fact appears to be overlooked
in the definitive edition of Littleton's masterpiece which
we owe to Eugene Wambaugh of Harvard University).
Littleton also was skilled in the philosophy of the Schools
and ends his Tenures with a flourish entirely in the manner of Aquinas: lex plus laudatur quando ratione probatur. The flourish reads like a gesture of defiance, as
if Littleton were taking sides in the crucial debate that
had arisen between the followers of Aquinas and the
followers of Ockham; between those who held that the
essence of law was reason and those who argued that
the essence of law was will.
An early instance of the conflict appears in the Year
Book 18-19, Edward III, where, in a dispute on an
obscure point of Real Property Law, Sharshulle, J., refers to precedents and adds: "nulle ensaumple est si fort
come resoun."
Thorpe (of Counsel): I think you will do as others
have done in like cases; or else we do not know what
the law is.
Hillary, J.: Volunt6 des justices.
Stonore, C. J.: Nanyl: ley est resoun.
The tension between realist and nominalist, between
Thomist and Occamist, exercised the mind of Christopher St. Germain, whose Doctor and Student was to
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influence English law and equity for more than two centuries. In the main the exposition follows the pattern
laid down in the classical Treatise of St. Thomas. The
foundations of law are laid first, in the eternal law which
is the wisdom of God moving all things to a good end,
and secondly in the law of nature of reasonable creatures, "the law of reason as it is commonly called by
those that are learned in the law of England." The law
of nature, St. Gernain says, is never changeable by diversity of time or place. Against this law, prescription,
statute or custom may not prevail, any alleged prescription or statute or custom brought in against it being void
and against justice. St. Germain borrows from Aquinas,
not directly, but indirectly through John Gerson, Chancellor of Paris. Now Gerson was a nominalist and a
follower of Ockham and so we find in St. Germain a
certain hesitation and an inclination in his later writing
to say that the eternal law is rather the Divine Will
than the Divine Wisdom ruling all things to a good end.
To this argument Leibnitz will make answer: Recht ist
nicht Recht weil Gott es gewollt hat sondern weil Gott
gerecht ist.
During all the centuries before the Reformation the
thought and language of the Common Lawyers followed
a kind of pattern or rhythm: the law of God, the law of
nature, the law of the land. It is the teaching of Henry
of Bracton. It is the teaching of Sir John Fortescue. It
is the rhythm of English jurisprudence that is on the lips
and in the writings of statesmen and of lawyers.
In 1468 the Lord Chancellor told the assembled peers
that Justice "was ground, well, and root of all prosper-
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ity, peace and public rule of every realm, whereupon all
the law of the world had been ground and set, which
resteth in three; that is to say, the law of God, the law
of nature, and the positive law."
At a later time the Speaker of the House of Commons declared that 'the laws whereby the ark of the government hath ever been steered are of three kinds, first
the Common Law, grounded or drawn from the law of
God, the law of nature or of reason, not mutable; the
second, the positive law founded, changed and altered
by and through the occasion and policies of the time;
the customs and uses, practised and allowed with the
time's approbation, without known beginnings.'
The judges are sworn to do equal law and justice to
all the King's subjects, rich and poor. "Therefore should
even a Statute be contrary to justice, according to Revelation, Nature or Reason, they may, indeed they must,
nullify it." The Serjeants are sworn to give counsel according to the law, that is to say, the law of God, the
law of reason and the law of the land.
The Year Books bear witness to the same order or
hierarchy of laws. There is in Plowden a report of the
well-known case of Hales vs. Petit in which the Common
Bench declared that suicide (in this case the suicide of
one of the King's judges) is an offense against God,
against Nature and against the King.
1.) Against God, in that it is a breach of His commandment, "Thou shalt not kill" and to kill oneself, by
which act he kills in presumption his own soul, is a
greater offense than killing another.
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2.) Against Nature; because it is contrary to the
rule of self-preservation which is the principle of nature,
for every living thing does by instinct of nature defend
itself against destruction and then to destroy oneself is
contrary to nature and a thing most horrible.
3.) Against'the King in that hereby he has lost a
subject... he being the head has lost one of his mystical
members.
At the crisis of English History, one who had been
Lord Chancellor, and Speaker of the House of Commons,
and Reader of the Inns of Court, and practitioner in the
Common Law, stood forth as the incarnation of English
Law and Equity and of the Christian philosophy and
theology that gave it character and energy. The life and
writings of the most illustrious of the common lawyers,
show that he held in all their fullness the Christian sense
of human dignity and human personality, and of the
sanctity of marriage, and of the necessary distribution
and balance of power between the Church and State in
a free community. In an age that had now grown evil,
he who as a stripling had lectured on the City of God
of St. Augustine before all the chief and best learned
men of the City of London, and who, as we know from
his long letter to Dorpius (now made available to us all
by the beneficence of Princeton) and from the many passages in his writings, was deeply read in the philosophy
and the theology of Aquinas, - this man was now led as
a prisoner from the Tower of London to Westminster
Hall, to take his trial on a charge of treason.
A statute dictated by Thomas Cromwell had de-
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clared the king to be the Supreme Head on earth of the
Ecclesia Anglicana. It gave the king authority to reform
and redress all errors and heresies in the land. A second
Statute made it treason for anyone maliciously to wish,
will or desire by words or in writing to deprive the King
of his dignity, title or name of his royal state.
In the first of the four counts of the Indictment it
was alleged that the prisoner, being asked in the Tower,
by the Secretary of State whether he "accepted and reputed the King as the Supreme Head of the Church in
England," remained silent and declined to make answer
(malitiose poenitus silebat).
To this count in the Indictment, the prisoner took
exception: "Touching, I say, this challenge and accusation, I answer that for this my taciturnity and silence
neither you nor your law nor any law in the world is able
justly and rightly to punish me unless you may beside it
lay to my charge either some word or some fact in deed."
The objection was overruled, and the pretended trial
proceeded to its close on all four counts in the Indictment. After a verdict of guilty on each count had been
returned, Thomas More claimed the right to speak his
mind: "seeing that I see ye are determined to condemn
me (God knoweth how) I will now in discharge of my
conscience speak my mind plainly and freely touching my
Indictment and your Statute withal."
He proceeded to argue that the Act under which he
had been charged and condemned was contrary to the
law of God, the law of reason and the law of the land.
"And forasmuch as this Indictment is grounded upon
an Act of Parliament directly repugnant to the laws of
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God and His Holy Church . . . it is therefore in law
among Christian men insufficient to charge any Christian man."
The Statute was against the law of reason: "For this
realm being but one member and a small part of the
Church, might not make a particular law, disagreeable
with the general law of the Church, no more than the
City of London being but one poor member in respect of
the whole realm, might make a law against an Act of
Parliament to bind the whole realm."
The Statute was against the law of the land. It was
"contrary to the law and Statutes of this our land, yet
unrepealed, as they might evidently perceive in Magna
Carta: Quod Ecclesia Anglicana libera sit et habeat
omnia jura sua integra et libertates suas illaesas.
In the reign of Henry VIII, says Professor Holdsworth,
Vinerian Professor of English Law at the University of
Oxford, "It was realized that the Acts of Parliament,
whether public or private, were legislative in character
and the judges were obligated to admit that these acts
however morally unjust must be obeyed.... The legislation which had deposed the Pope and made the Church
an integral part of the State, had made it clear that the
morality of the provisions of a law, or the reasons which
induced the legislature to pass it, could not be regarded
by the courts."
It was obviously difficult to assign any limits to the
power of the Acts of a body which had effected changes
so sweeping as those effected by the Reformation Parliament. Lord Burleigh is reported by James I to have said
that he knew not what an Act of Parliament could not do
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in England. When an Act of Parliament had acquired this
authority, says Professor Holdsworth, the last remnants
of the idea that there might be fundamental laws, which
could not be changed by any person or body of persons
in the State necessarily disappears.
After the Reformation, the Parliament of England
was no longer bound by the laws of nature or the law
of God.
In the current edition of May's ParliamentaryPractice it is said that the Constitution has assigned no limits
to the authority of Parliament over all matters and persons within its jurisdiction. A law may be unjust and
contrary to the principles of sound government; but
Parliament is not controlled in its discretion, and when it
errs, its errors can only be corrected by itself.
In the year 1946, Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P.,
Attorney General, spoke the orthodox constitutional doctrine. "Parliament is sovereign; it can make any laws.
It could ordain that all blue-eyed babies be destroyed at
birth; but it has been recognized that it is. no good passing laws unless you can be reasonably sure that, in the
eventualities which they contemplate, these laws will be
supported and can be enforced." Parliamentary jurisprudence, one may observe, is a nice calculation of force.
The Omnipotence of Parliament is inalienable. In
the official comment to the British Draft of an International Bill of Human Rights, it is plainly said that, "Proposals that the provisions of the International Bill of
Human Rights should be embodied in the constitutions
of States parties to the Bill, or otherwise consecrated by
special constitutional guarantees, are not practicable for
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all countries. Some countries like the United Kingdom,
have no rigid constitution, and, as a matter of internal
law, it is not possible to surround any provision with
any special constitutional guarantee. No enactment can
be given any greater authority than an Act of Parliament, and one Act of Parliament can repeal any other
Act of Parliament." Soon after the enactment of the
Statute of Westminster 1931, (which recognized the legislative autonomy of the dominions) a professor of Constitutional Law at a public lecture, in the presence and to
the confusion of the Lord Chancellor, declared that the
Imperial Parliament by virtue of its Omnipotence, was
entitled at its pleasure to repeal the Statute at any time.
Now, though the theory (or the supposition) of the
Omnipotence of Parliament was implicit in the Reformation Statutes, the process of translating this new theory
into a practical rule of jurisprudence was not easy or
simple. This new theory threatened the whole existence
of the 'Common Law which had its foundation in the
natural law and which was in the language of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and for this reason we may
think, "a far more developed, more rational and mightier
body of law than the Roman."
From the first there was resistance. There was the
resistance of John Fisher and Thomas More and the
Carthusians. After all these had been done to death,
there was in the very next year the resistance of the men
who rose in the Pilgrimage of Grace, and who demanded
among other things that "the Common Laws may have
place as was used in the beginning of the reign." For
the Common Law of medieval England was a popular
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thing. "The law is the highest inheritance of the King
by which he and all his subjects are now ruled, and if
there were no law there would be no King and no inheritance." The words are those of an anonymous scribe
in the Year Book. After an interval of centuries another
scribe will say: "The Common Law is the surest and
best inheritance that any subject hath, et qui perde ceo
perde tout."
The publication in the Tudor and the Stuart time of
successive editions of Bracton and of Fortescue and the
Year Books gave new strength and courage to the resistance. But for these new editions, in the opinion of
Maitland, the work which was done by Sir Edward
Coke would have been impossible. In his enumeration
of the kinds of law that exist in territories subject to the
English Crown, Coke - who settled the last draft of the
Charter of Virginia in 1606 - mentions in one breath
the Law of Nature and the Common Law. There is perhaps a danger lest men may confuse and even identify
these two things, the foundation and the building, since
each in its separate way has reference to reason.
In Bonham's case, which has had a less fortunate history in England than in the United States, Coke sought
to restore the idea of a fundamental law which should
limit alike the Crown and Parliament. He claimed for
the Judges of the Common Law the power and the duty
to control Acts of Parliament and even to annul them
if an Act were "against common right and reason or
repugnant or impossible to be performed."
In the debate on the Petition of Right, Coke, resisting
a clause which would save the sovereign power of the
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King, declares: "I know that Prerogative is part of the
law.., but Sovereign Power is no parliamentary word.
In my opinion it weakens Magna Carta . .. Shall we
now add it, we shall weaken the foundation of law and
then the building must needs fall. Take we heed what
we yield unto. Magna Carta is such a fellow that he
will have no Sovereign."
And here we may recall the rule laid down at the
opening of the colonial period in Calvin's case, that
"conquered heathen countries at once lose their rights
or laws by the conquest, for that they be not only against
Christianity but against the law of God and of nature
contained in the Decalogue." (On the other hand if an
uninhabited country be discovered or planted by English
subjects, all the English laws then in being which are the
birthright of every subject are immediately there in
force).
For a long century after Coke the idea that the law
of reason, now beginning to be identified with the Coinmon Law, could be regarded as a fundamental law, had
the favour of many minds. Sir Henry Finch, in his
Nomotechnica, which is "un description del common ley
d'Angleterre," examining the law of nature and the law
of reason, declares that the rules of reason are of two
sorts: some are taken from 'foreign' learning; the rest
are proper to the law. "Of the first sort are the principles and sound conclusions, out of the best of the very
bowels of divinity, grammar, logic; also from philosophy,
natural, political, economic, moral, though in our Reports and Year Books, they do not come under the same
terms. Yet the things we find are the same, for the
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sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up in
the ashes of the law." Natural law in the classical and
Christian conception may be said to mean the sum in
order of the dynamic tendencies that are proper to man
as a rational being. Natural law has reference to the
internal tendency or thrust of things, their "dynamisme
original." It is rooted in the order of the world and
in the conception of man as a part of that order; in a
study of the inner constitution of man, of ethics and psychology and the metaphysical foundations of our being.
The observation of external things reveals in nature a
hierarchy of orders: the mineral, the vegetable, the
animal order, each serving its own end, and at the same
time subserving each higher order; and all of them serving and subserving the life of man. As the flower and
the plant, unlike the mineral thing, have a principle of
life and growth in them, we study the law according to
which they live and grow. So, too, with animals, they have
being and life and a law according to which their life
is lived. So, too with man, he shares with all things the
first law of all being: perseverarein esse suo. Everyman
and every organised community of men will defend his
or its existence and will be entitled to defend its existence
against unjust attack. On another plane, the animal
plane, jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia
docuit, ut conjunctio maris et feminae et educatio prolis,
though, among rational beings, these things are naturally
within the control of mind and conscience. Again, on
the purely rational plane, there is the appetite for life in
an organised society and the thrust and tendency of the
mind to truth and of the will to good. And this appetite
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for the good and for the true takes us beyond ourselves
and beyond the community of men and beyond the State.
It is "the cry of the finite for the infinite."
"And thus I know
this earth is not my sphere
For I cannot so narrow me
but that I still exceed it."
So again, Mat-hew Hale, in his controversy with
Thomas Hobbes, stands in the ancient ways. The theory
of Hobbes, with its nominalism and its scepticism, was
at once fatal to the tradition of divine and natural law,
and to the conception of fundamental rights that were
rooted in that tradition.
At the turn of the 18th century the idea of a fundamental law was firmly asserted by Chief Justice Holt,
who thought it was part of a judge's daily task "to construe and expound Acts of Parliament and adjudge them
to be void." He was, you may think, a pioneer of judicial review.
In Blackstone's Commentaries, the old tradition which
distinguishes the law of God, the law of nature and the
law of the land, and which recognizes certain fundamental rights that are based on this distinction, is restated and reaffirmed. As one who cherishes the old
belief in the law of God and the law of nature, Blackstone qualifies as 'absolute' the rights to life, to liberty
and to property (and certain auxiliary rights) which are
declared in Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the
Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. And he detaches himself from those who "by a figure rather too
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bold," identify the Supremacy of Parliament with Parliamentary Omnipotence.
The rights that Blackstone qualifies as absolute were
already familiar to residents in the Thirteen Colonies,
where a period of untechnical, popular law had been
followed by the slow and gradual reception of most of
the rules of the Common Law.
Early in the 18th Century, in a case in Massachusetts
(Giddings vs. Brown) which will be wlel-known to you,
one Symonds, the Magistrate, after referring with respect to the works of Sir Henry Finch and of Dalton,
based his judgment on the "fundamental law which
God and nature had given to the people and which cannot be infringed." The right of property he holds to be
such a fundamental right. In most jurisdictions it
would seem that the law of God and nature at this time
was looked upon as the true and fundamental law and
that all temporal legislation was considered to be binding only so far as it was an expression of natural law.
In the decade immediately preceding the Declaration
of Independence, some 2,500 copies of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law which was for him "the best birthright and noblest inheritance of mankind" were purchased and received in the colonies of the Atlantic seaboard. James Wilson was at the time a busy practitioner
and had drawn from Hooker and from Grotius, and beyond them from Fortescue and from Bracton, the traditional principles of the Common Law. "The Law of
Nature," he will say, "and the law of revelation are both
divine; they flow, though in different channels, from
the same adorable source." Chief Justice Marshall and

NATURAL LAW AND COMMON LAW

Chancellor Kent, on their own acknowledgment, owed
to Blackstone their vocation and their legal training.
In all these ways the tradition of the Common Law
and of the philosophy that is latent in the Common Law,
passed to the new States of the American Union, and to
the men who sat under the new Constitution as the Justices of the Supreme Court. The Constitution of the
United States was written by men who had Magna Carta
and Coke on Littleton before their eyes. I shall not attempt to trace the arguments and the methods by which
Marshall and Kent and Story and Taney imposed limits
on the legislative power and added the substance of justice to due process of law. Let me indorse the opinion
of Professor Holdsworth who says that the Supreme
Court of the United States is a body of men which safeguards more effectively than any other tribunal in the
world the medieval ideal of the supremacy of the law,
an ideal which, one may recall, was in one way or another, common to Holt, to Coke and to Sir Thomas
More. The Justices of the Supreme Court are in the
authentic tradition of the Common Law and are called
upon to be "the Grand Depositories of the fundamental
laws" of the republic, and in a measure, of mankind.
I do not of course know whether the habit of your
justices is the habit of our old judges of the Common
Law who were said by Fortescue "to sit only from eight
o'clock to eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and after they
have refreshed themselves, passed the rest of the day in
studying the laws, reading Holy Scriptures, and otherwise in contemplation at their good pleasure, their life
being more contemplative than active."

44

NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

The Universities and scholars of the United States, with
their constant study of the principles of the Common Law,
and their critical editions of the texts of the great masters,
of Glanvil, of Bracton, of Littleton, of the Year Books, are
also in the authentic tradition of a law whose deepest
foundations and latent principles are laid in the philosophy of Christian jurisprudence and of natural law.
At a time when the call of mankind and a great part
of the efforts of the United Nations is for a restatement
of the fundamental rights of human personality -and
their enforcement - rights to life, to liberty, to property,
and to the pursuit of happiness, there is on the lawyers
and the Law Schools of the United States, a heavy responsibility, in the interests of their own people and of
an attentive world, to elucidate the philosophy and the
theology of the law which is their high inheritance.
The vocation of our time for a statement of the fundamental principles of law and justice has met with a
splendid response at this shrine and University of Notre
Dame du Lac. In the fulfillment of the work that you,
Father Chairman, and Dean of the Law School have
undertaken, you will naturally look for guidance and
inspiration to one who is always the Mother of Good
Counsel. At this time of her 'singular privilege,' and
Octave may not we practitioners and professors of what
is, in origin and essence, a great system of Christian jurisprudence, call her again, in hope and love, Our Lady
7
of the Common Law.

7 The paper was read on the morrow of the Feast of the Immaculate
Conception of Our Lady, 1949. The title "Our Lady of the Common
Law" was used by Sir Frederick Pollock. (See Pollock-Holmes Letters,
English Edition, Introduction, p. xv.)
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THE NATURAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ANCIENT Chinese philosophers were wont to distinguish the passive and active elements of Being, called
respectively Yin and Yang. If I may be permitted to
employ this locution for a moment, the "yang" element
of American Constitutional Law is Judicial Review, the
power, and corresponding duty of a court to pass upon
the validity of legislative acts in relation to a higher law
which is regarded as being binding on both the legislature and the court. By the same token the "yin" element
is the aforesaid higher law. Today this role is ordinarily
filled by a constitutional document, the Constitution of
the United States being the supreme example; but
earlier, Natural Law or some derivative concept took the
part of "yin." Hence the purpose of this discoursewhich is to demonstrate how very large a part of its content American Constitutional Law has always owed, and
still owes, to its Natural Law genesis. As the matrix of
American Constitutional Law, the documentary Constitution is still, in important measure, Natural Law under
the skin.
Of "Natural Law" there is no end of definitions, as a
casual examination of Sir Thomas Erskine Holland's
47
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Elements of Jurisprudence suffices to show. I venture to
quote a few passages from the 13th edition: I
Aristotle fully recognizes the existence of a natural as well as of a legal Justice. He mentions as an
ordinary device of rhetoric the distinction which
may be drawn between the written law, and "the
common law" which is in accordance with Nature
and immutable.
The Stoics were in the habit of identifying Nature
with Law in the higher sense, and of opposing both
of these terms to Law which is such by mere human
appointment. "Justice," they say, "is by Nature
and not by imposition." "It proceeds from Zeus
and the common Nature."
The same view finds expression in the Roman
lawyers. "Law," says Cicero, "is the highest reason,
implanted in Nature, which commands those things
which ought to be done and prohibits the reverse."
"The highest law was born in all the ages before any
law was written or State was formed." .. . "We are

by Nature inclined to love mankind, which is the
foundation of law." ...
S. Thomas Aquinas: "Participatio legis aeternae
in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur."
Grotius: "Jus naturale est dictatum rectae rationis.... "

For our purposes it is not essential to choose nicely
among these definitions of what Cicero and St. Thomas
call lex naturalisand Grotius terms jus naturale. We are
concerned only with certain juristic connotations of the
1 HOLLAND, Elements of Jurisprudence 32-4 (13th ed. 1924).
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concept: first, that Natural Law is entitled by its intrinsic
excellence to prevail over any law which rests solely on
human authority; second, that Natural Law may be
appealed to by human beings against injustices sanctioned by human authority.
I

-

Natural Law Into Natural Rights

In a famous passage in the Rhetoric, Aristotle advised
advocates that when they had "no case according to the
law of the land," they should "appeal to the law of nature," and, quoting from Antigone of Sophocles, argue
that "an unjust law is not a law." 2 While this advice
scarcely reveals any deep devotion on Aristotle's part to
the Natural Law concept, it does evidence the short step,
which even at that date existed in men's minds, between
the concept and the idea of a juridical recourse to it.
Three hundred years later we find Cicero in his De
Legibus contrasting "summa lex" and "lex scripta";
"summum jus" and "jus civile"; "universum jus" and
"jus civile"; and on one occasion appealing in the Senate
to "recta ratio" against the "lex scripta." s
It was during the Middle Ages, however, that the conception of Natural Law as a code of human rights first
took on real substance and importance. This was so
even on the Continent, 4 albeit institutions were lacking
2 Id. at 32 n.4.

s Id. at 33 n.6; see also, the present writer's book, CORWIN, Liberty
Against Government 15-7 (1948), and accompanying notes.
4 See Gxrzit,
Political Theories of the Middle Ages 80-1 (Maitland's

trans. 1927).
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there through which such ideas could be rendered effective practically. In England, on the other hiand, this lack
was supplied by the royal courts, administering the
Common Law. The impregnation of the Common Law
with higher law concepts proceeded rapidly in the Fourteenth Century under Edward III. Of the thirty-two
royal confirmations of the Charter noted by Sir Edward
Coke, fifteen occurred in this reign; and near the end of
it, in 1368, to the normal form of confirmation the declaration was added by statute that any statute passed
contrary to Magna Carta "soit tenuz p'nul," words which
seem clearly to have been addressed to the royal officials,
including the judges.5
Here, to be sure, Magna Carta fills the role of Natural
Law, but it is a Magna Carta already infused with Natural Law content, as is shown by Bracton's earlier designation of Chapter 29 as "constitutio libertatis"; and in
the Fifteenth Century the "lex naturae" has completely
replaced "Magna Carta" in the juristic equation. This
is notably so, for example, in the pages of Fortescue's
famous In Praise of the Law of England (De Laudibus
Legum Angliae), which was but one of many similar encomia. As Father Figgis has written of this period: 6
The Common Law is pictured invested with a halo
of dignity peculiar to the embodiment of the deepest
principles and to the highest expression of human
reason and of the law of nature implanted by God
5 The preceding sentence is taken from CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 26.
6 As quoted in CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 28.
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in the heart of man. As yet men are not clear that
an Act of Parliament can do more than declare the
Common Law. It is the Common Law which men
set up as an object of worship. The Common Law
is the perfect ideal of law; for it is natural reason
developed and expounded by a collective wisdom of
many generations . . . Based on long usage and
almost supernatural wisdom, its authority is above,
rather than below that of Acts of Parliament or
royal ordinances, which owe their fleeting existence
to the caprice of the King or to the pleasure of
councillors, which have a merely material sanction
and may be repealed at any moment.
Thus the Common Law becomes higher law, without
at all losing its quality as positive law, the law of the
King's courts and of the rising Inns of Court. Nor does
Fortescue fail to stress its dual character. Asserting the
identity of "perfect justice" with "legal justice," and the
subordination of the King to the law, i.e., the law courts,
he proceeds to counsel his Prince as follows: 7
...
there will be no occasion for you to search into
the arcana of our laws with such tedious application
and study . . . It will not be convenient by severe
study, or at the expense of the best of your time, to
pry into nice points of law: such matters may be
left to your judges ... ; furthermore, you will pronounce judgment in the courts by others than in
person, it being not customary for the Kings of
England to sit in courts or pronounce judgment
themselves (proprio ore nullus regum Angilae judiId. at 30.
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cium proferre uses est). I know very well the quickness of your apprehension and the forwardness of
your parts; but for that expertness in the laws which
is requisite for judges the studies of twenty years
(viginti annorum lucubrationes) barely suffice.
In short, Natural Law has become a craft mystery the mystery of Bench and Bar -what it has remained,
now in greater, now in lesser measure ever since.
A century and a half later we find Lord Coke, Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas, describing a scene s which
reads like a re-enactment of that imagined by Fortescue.
But to his predecessor's work of edification, Coke adds
official recognition that judicial custodianship of the
Common Law signifies the power and duty of the law
courts to apply its measure both to the Royal Prerogative
and to the power of Parliament. The latter claim appears in his famous "dictum," so-called, in Dr. Bonham's
Case,9 which reads: 10
And it appears in our books, that in many cases,
the common law will controul Acts of Parliament,
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for
when an Act of Parliament is against common right
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such Act to be void....
And this was said, it should be noted, at the end of a
8 12 Rep. 63-65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341-1343 (1609).
9 8 Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
10 Id., 8 Rep. at 118a; see also Proclamations, 12 Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep.

1352 (1611).
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century in which the thesis of Parliament's absolute
power to alter and abrogate any and all laws had been
asserted again and again; 11 and not only asserted but
demonstrated by its part in the Tudor ecclesiastical and
religious revolution.
Eighty years after Dr. Bonham's Case, "The great
Mr. Locke" produced his second Treatise on Civil Government, in which the dissolution of Natural Law into
the natural rights of the individual - the rights of "life,
liberty and estate"- is completed through the agency of
the Social Compact. Of judicial review, to be sure,
Locke appears to have no inkling. He relied for the protection of the individual's inherent and inalienable rights
on: first, Parliament; second, the right of revolution.
Even so, Locke's contribution to both the doctrinal justification of judicial review and to the theory of its
proper scope is first and last a very considerable one.
Coke and Locke are the two great names in the common Anglo-American higher law tradtion, and the contribution of each is enhanced by that of the other.
Locke's version of Natural Law not only rescues Coke's
version of the English constitution from a localized
patois, restating it in the universal tongue of the
Eighteenth Century, it also supplements it in important
respects. Coke's endeavor was to put forward the historical procedures of the Common Law as a permanent
restraint on power, and especially on the power of the
English crown. Locke, in the limitations which he im11

See CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32-3 and notes.
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poses on legislative power, is looking rather to the security of the substantive rights of the individual- those
rights which are implied in the basic arrangements of
society at all times and in all places. While Coke extricated the notion of fundamental law from what must
sooner or later have proved a fatal nebulosity, he did so
at the expense of archaism. Locke, on the other hand,
in cutting loose in great measure from the historical
method of reasoning, opened the way to the larger issues
with which American Constitutional Law has been called
12
upon to grapple in its latest maturity.
II -

Natural Law and Judicial Review

The fons et origo of both the doctrine and the practice
of judicial review in the United States is Coke's invocation in Dr. Bonham's Case of "common right and reason," which as explained by the Sixteenth Century
author of Doctor and Student, was the term used "by
them that be learned in the laws of England" in place
of the term "law and nature." 13 Commended by two
Lord Chief Justices, Hobart and Holt, the dictum had
won repeated recognition in various legal abridgments
and digests before the outbreak of the American Revolution.14 In the early 1700's it was relied on by a British
colonial law officer as affixing the stigma of invalidity to
an act of the Barbadoes assembly creating paper
12 Parts of the above paragraph are taken from CoRwIN,
op. cit. supra
note 3, at 50-1.
is See CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 35; Id. at n.40.
14 Id. at 39 n.43.
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money. 15 In 1759, we encounter a casual reference by
Governor Cadwalader Colden of the Province of New
York to "a judicial power of declaring them [laws]
void." 16
But just as Coke had forged his celebrated dictum as a
possible weapon for the struggle which he already foresaw against the divine rights pretensions of James I, so its
definitive reception in this country was motivated by the
rising agitation against the Mother Country. The creative first step was taken by James Otis in February, 1761,
in his argument for the Boston merchants against an application by a British customs official for a general warrant authorizing him to search their cellars and warehouses for smuggled goods. An act of Parliament "against
natural Equity," Otis asserted, was void. "If an Act of
Parliament," he continued, "should be made in the very
Words of this Petition, it would be void," and it would
be the duty of the executive courts to pass it "into disuse." 17 Four years later, according to Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts, the prevailing argument against
the Stamp Act was that it was "against Magna Charta
and the natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore,
according to Lord Coke, null and void," testimony which
is borne out by a contemporaneous decision of a Virginia
county court.' 8 On the very eve of the Declaration of
See II CHALMERS, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers 27-38 (1814).
16 II N. Y. HIST'L SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 204; see also, CHALMERS,
PoliticalAnnals in I N. Y. HIST'L. SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 81 (1868).
17 Adams' report of Otis' argument in Paxton's Case, Quincy (App. I)
474 (Mass. 1761).
18 Quincy (App. 1) 519 n.18 (Mass. 1761).
15
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Independence, Judge William Cushing, later to become
one of Washington's appointees to the original bench
of the Supreme Court, charged a Massachusetts jury
to ignore certain acts of Parliament as "void and inoperative" and was congratulated by John Adams for
doing so. 19
And meantime, in 1772, George Mason had developed
a similar argument against an act of the Virginia assembly of 1682, under which certain Indian women had
been sold into slavery. The act in question, he asserted,
"was originally void of itself, because contrary to natural
right." 20 And, he continued: 21
If natural right, independence, defect of representation, and disavowal of protection, are not sufficient to keep them from the coercion of our laws,
on what other principles can we justify our opposition to some late acts of power exercised over us by
the British legislature? Yet they only pretended to
impose on us a paltry tax in money; we on our free
neighbors, the yoke of perpetual slavery. Now all
acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural
right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in
the nature of things, considered as void. The laws
of nature are the laws of God; whose authority can
be superseded by no power on earth... All human
constitutions which contradict his laws, we are in
conscience bound to disobey. Such have been the
adjudications of our courts of justice.
19 V MCMASTER,

(1905).

History of the People of the United States 395

20 Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772).

21 Id. at 114.
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Mason concluded by citing Coke and Hobart. The court
22
adjudged the act of 1682 repealed.
Nor did the establishment of the first American constitutions cause this course of reasoning to be abandoned.
To the contrary, the most eminent judges of the first
period of American Constitutional Law, which comes to
an end approximately with the death of Marshall in
1835, appealed freely to natural rights and the social
compact as limiting legislative power, and based decisions
on this ground, and the same doctrine was urged by the
greatest lawyers of the period without reproach. Typical
in this connection is the case of Wilkinson v. Leland, 3
which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1829. Attorney for the defendants in error was Daniel Webster.
"If," said he, "at this period there is not a general restraint on Legislatures in favor of private rights, there
is an end to private property. Though there may be no
prohibition in the constitution, the Legislature is restrained ... from acts subverting the great principles of
24
republican liberty and of the social compact ....",
To this contention his opponent William Wirt responded
thus: "Who is the sovereign... ? Is it not the Legislature of the State, and are not its acts effectual ... unless
they come in contact with the great principles of the
social compact?" 25 The act of the Rhode Island legislature under review was upheld, but said Justice Story
22
23
24
25

Id. at 114, 123.
2 Pet. 627, 7 L. Ed. 542 (1829).
Id., 2 Pet. at 646.
Id., 2 Pet. at 652.
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speaking for the Court: "That government can scarcely
be deemed to be free where the rights of property are
left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body
without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a
free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held
sacred." 26 Indeed, fourteen years before this the same
Court had unanimously held void, on the basis of these
same principles, an act of the Virginia legislature which
27
purported to revoke a grant of land.

In short, judicial review initially had nothing to do
with a written constitution. In point of fact, the first
appearance of the idea of judicial review in this country
antedated the first written constitution by at least two
decades. Judicial review continued, moreover, in a relationship of semi-independence of the written constitution on the basis of "common right and reason," Natural
Law, natural rights, and kindred postulates throughout
the first third of the Nineteenth Century. But meantime,
a competing conception of judicial review as something
anchored to the written constitution had been in the
process of formulation in answer to Blackstone's doctrine
that in every State there is a supreme, absolute power,
and that this power is vested in the legislature. From this
angle judicial review based on "common right and reason," or on Natural Law ideas, was an impertinence, as
Blackstone took pains to point out in his Commentaries.2"
26
27

28

Id., 2 Pet. at 657.
Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 3 L. Ed. 650 (1815).
1 BL. COMM. *46, 91.
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But suppose that the supreme will in the State was not
embodied in the legislature and its acts, but in the people
at large and their constitution - what conclusions would
follow from this premise? In The Federalist, No. 78,
Hamilton suggested an answer to this question, and in
1803, in Marbury v. Madison,29 Chief Justice Marshall
elaborated the answer: it is the duty of courts when confronted with a conflict between an act (i.e., a statute)
of "the mere agents of the people" (that is, of the ordinary legislature) and the act of the people themselves
(to wit, the constitution), to prefer the latter.
The inevitable clash between the two conceptions of
judicial review was first unfolded in the case of Calder
v. Bull,30 decided by the Supreme Court in 1798. There
it was held that the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I,
section 10 of the Constitution applied only to penal legislation and hence did not protect rights of property and
contract from interference by a state legislature; but Justice Samuel Chase endeavored to soften this blow to proprietarian interests by citing the power of the state courts
to enforce extra-constitutional limitations on legislative
power, such as many of them were in fact already doing.
Said he: 31

I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state
Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul; although its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law,
29

1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

30 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798).
31

Id., 3 Dall. at 387-9.
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of the state . . . There are certain vital principles
in our free Republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse
of legislative power ...

The genius, the nature, and

the spirit of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general
principles of law and reason forbid them.
To hold otherwise, it was stated, would be "political
heresy, altogether inadmissible. '32
Chase belonged to the older generation of American
lawyers and had been brought up on Coke-Littleton,
having received much of his legal education in London
in the Inns of Court. Alongside him on the Supreme
Bench, however, sat a very different type of lawyer, one
of "that brood of young lawyers," characterized by Jefferson as "ephemeral insects of the law," who had imbibed their law from Blackstone's Commentaries. This
was James Iredell of North Carolina, who demurred
strongly to Chase's natural rights doctrine. "True," said
he, "some speculative jurists" had held "that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void;
but the correct view, he stated, was that: "
If . . . a government, composed of legislative,

executive and judicial departments, were established, by a Constitution, which imposed no limits
on the legislative power ...

whatever the legislative

power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted,
and the judicial power, could never interpose to
32 Ibid.

23 Id., 3 Dall. at 398-9.
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pronounce it void . .. Sir William Blackstone, having put the strong case of an act of parliament,
which should authorize a man to try his own cause,
explicitly adds, that even in that case, "there is no
court that has power to defeat the intent of the
legislature when couched in such evident...
words.... "
The debate thus begun was frequently renewed in
other jurisdictions; and long before the Civil War, Iredell had won the fight- but as we shall see, more in
appearance than in reality. In 1868 Judge Cooley, in
considering the circumstances in which a legislative enactment may be declared unconstitutional, wrote: 34
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be,
that, except where the constitution has imposed
limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate
according to natural justice or not in any particular
case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights
of the people of the State, except as those rights are
secured by some constitutional provision which
comes within the judicial cognizance.
Yet, six years later we find the Supreme Court of the
United States pronouncing a statute of the State of
Kansas void on the very grounds that had been laid
down in Chase's dictum. Speaking for an all but unanimous Court, Justice Miller said: '6
34

COOLEY, Constitutional Limitations 168 (3d ed. 1874).

s5 Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 662, 22 L.

Ed. 455 (1874).
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It must be conceded that there are ...

rights in

every free government beyond the control of the
State. A government which recognized no such
rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the
property of its citizens subject at all times to the
absolute disposition and unlimited control of even
the most democratic depository of power, is after all
but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the
many, of the majority, if you choose to call it so, but
it is none the less a despotism. It may well be
doubted if a man is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his own, all in which he has placed
his happiness, and the security of which is essential
to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of
others, whether it is not wiser that this power should
be exercised by one man than by many.
One Justice dissented, asserting that such views tended to
"convert the government into a judicial despotism. ,36
But vastly more important is the fact that in the very
process of discarding the doctrine of natural rights and
adherent doctrines as the basis of judicial review, the
courts have contrived to throw about those rights which
originally owed their protection to these doctrines the
folds of the documentary constitution. In short, things
are not always what they seem to be, even when they
seem so most.3 7

The indebtedness of the institution of

judicial review and of the rights protected by it to Natural Law ideas is by no means sufficiently summed up in
the glib statement that nowadays judicial review is confined to the four comers of the written constitution.
36 Id., 20 Wall. at 669.

NATURAL

LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

III - How Natural Law Doctrines Were Used to Fill
a Gap in the Written Constitution
It is a commonplace that the doctrine of natural rights
was conveyed into the American written Constitution by
bills of rights, the earliest example of which was the Virginia Declaration of Rights of June 12, 1776. This commonplace is, however, only a half of the truth, and indeed the lesser half. As has been indicated, the type of
judicial review which stemmed from Coke's dictum
supplied a second avenue for natural rights concepts
into the constitutional document. In this section I shall
first illustrate this proposition with the doctrine of vested
rights.
Not all the early state constitutions were accompanied
by bills of rights. Moreover, the availability of such bills
of rights as existed as a basis for judicial inquiry into the
validity of legislative measures was sharply challenged at
times. Even more important was the fact that, as it
came early to be appreciated, bills of rights or no bill of
rights, the early state constitutions left proprietarian interests in a very exposed position vis a vis the new popular assemblies, for which the prerogatives of the British
38
Parliament itself were sometimes claimed.
The formidable character of legislative power in these
early instruments of government as regards the property
37 See e.g., COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 34, at 174-6, where the principle
of the separation of powers is made to do duty for Natural Law concepts.
38 See CoxE, An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation 223 et seq. (1893); V HAMILTON WORKS 116 (Lodge ed. 1904); VII
id. at 198.
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interest, was exhibited in more ways than one. In the first
place, in the prevailing absence of courts of equity, legislative assemblies interfered almost at will with judicial
decisions, and particularly those involving disputes over
property. The case of Calder v. Bull,3" mentioned earlier,
affords an example of this sort of thing. The Connecticut
courts, having refused to probate a certain will, were to
all intents and purposes ordered to revise their decision,
which they did, with the result that the heirs at law to an
estate were ousted, after a year and a half of possession,
by the beneficiaries of the will. A second and highly impressive proof of early state legislative power is afforded
by the ferocious catalogue of legislation directed against
the Tories, embracing acts of confiscation, bills of pains
and penalties, even acts of attainder. One sample of such
legislation came under the scrutiny of the United States
Supreme Court in 1800, in the case of Cooper v. Telfair.4 ° Said Justice Washington: "The presumption, indeed, must always be in favor of the validity of laws, if
the contrary is not clearly demonstrated." 41 On this
ground and one or two others, the Georgia act was sustained, although Justice Chase opined that with the
Federal Constitution now in effect such an act would be
clearly void; but this act was passed during the Revolution. Thirdly, with the general collapse of values early
in 1780, every state legislature became a scene of vehement agitation on the part of the widespread farmer39 Note 30 supra.
40 4 Dall. 14, 1 L. Ed. 721 (1800).
41 Id., 4 Dall. at 18.
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debtor class in favor of paper money laws and other
measures of like intent. For the first time, the property
interest was confronted with "the power of numbers,"
and, in the majority of cases, the power of numbers
triumphed.
Could the state bill of rights withstand the flood? It
soon transpired that they were an utterly ineffective bulwark of private rights against state legislative power.
And so the moverent was launched which led to the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787. That abuse by the
state legislatures of their powers had been the most important single cause leading to the Convention was asserted by Madison early in the course of its deliberations,
and others agreed.42 So far as we are concerned, the
most important expression of the Convention's anxiety
to clip the wings of the high-flying local sovereignties is
to be found in the opening paragraph of section 10 of
Article I, which reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,. or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money, emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
The provision which here claims attention is the prohibition of ex post facto laws. What did those who urged
their insertion in the Constitution think these words
42 See I FARRAND, The Records of the Federal Convention 48, 133-34,
255, 424, 525, 533; II id. at 285 (1937).
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meant? Some of them, we know, thought the clause
would rule out all "retrospective" legislation, meaning
thereby legislation which operated detrimentally upon
existing property rights. 4 3 But as we have seen in Calder

v. Bull, the clause was confined to penal legislation, to
statutes making criminal an act which was innocent
when done. That the Court was thoroughly aware of
the breach it was thus creating in the Constitution, the
opinions of all the Justices, except that of the Blackstonian Iredell, make amply apparent; and going beyond
apology, Chase sought to show how the gap could be
stopped by the local judiciaries by recourse to extraconstitutional limitations, "the spirit of our free republican governments," "the social compact," considerations
of "natural justice," and the like. The local judiciaries
responded to the suggestion with varying degrees of
alacrity, and the sum total of their efforts was one of the
most fertile doctrines of American Constitutional Law,
the doctrine of vested rights, the practical purport of
which was that the effect of legislation on existing property rights was a primary test of its validity, and that by
this test legislation must stop short of curtailing existing
44
rights of ownership, at least unduly or unreasonably.
But in fact, Chase's dictum only stimulated a movement already begun. Three years prior to Calder v. Bull,
we find Justice Paterson charging a federal jury in a case
45
involving vested rights in these words:
43 On this point see CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 60-1 n. 4 .
44 Id. at 72 et seq.
45 VanHome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 310, 1 L. Ed. 391

(1795).
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. . . the right of acquiring and possessing property

and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and unalienable rights of man. Men have a
sense of property: Property is necessary to their
subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants
and desires; its security was one of the objects, that
induced them to unite in society ...

The preserva-

tion of property.., is a primary object of the social
compact, and, by the late constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law.
Indeed, a majority of the cases of judicial review after
the Cokian model, referred to in Section II of this paper,
involved property rights. Nor should the great name of
Chancellor Kent be overlooked in this connection. First
as judge, then as Chancellor in his home state, and
finally as author of the famed Commentaries, Kent developed the doctrine's fullest possibilities and spread its
influence fastest and farthest.
Yet even as Kent was vaunting private property as an
instrument of God for realizing his plans for the advancement of the race, it was becoming less and less
practicable to urge such considerations on American
judges. The old-type Cokian judge had about disappeared - Blackstone was in the saddle in the law offices
and in the court houses. What is more, with the accession of Jackson to the Presidency there took place an
immense resurgence of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Of the numerous corollaries into which the
doctrine proliferated, two are relevant to our interest:
first, the Constitution was an ordinance of the people,
and its supremacy sprang from the fact that it embodied
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their will; second, of the three departments of state government, the legislature stood nearest the people. It followed that the courts had better go slow in holding state
legislative acts invalid; and that on no account must they
do so except for a plain violation of the Constitution,
i.e., of the people's will as there expressed.
Bench and Bar were confronted with a dilemma:
either they must cast the doctrine of vested rights to the
wolves or they must bring it within the sheepfold of the
written Constitution. The second alternative was adopted
in due course. Ultimately the doctrine found a home
within the Due Process Clause, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." The original significance of the clause was purely
procedural - nobody should be punished without a trial
by jury or "writ original of the Common Law." In the
revamped clause the term "due process of law" simply
fades out and the clause comes to read, in effect, "no
person shall be deprived of property, period." Thus was
the narrow interpretation which was planted on the Ex
4
Post Facto Clause in Calder v. Bull revenged in kind. "
This achievement was consummated in the famous
case of Wynehamer v. People,47 in which, in 1856, the
New York Court of Appeals set aside a state-wide prohibition law as comprising, with regard to liquors in
existence at the time of its going into effect, an act of
destruction of property not within the power of govern46 See CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 84-115.

,7 13 N. Y. (3 Kern) 378 (1856).
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ment to perform "even by the forms of due process of
law." An interesting feature of Judge 'Comstock's opinion in the case is his repudiation of all arguments against
the statute sounding in Natural Law concepts, like "fundamental principles of liberty," "common reason and
natural rights," and so forth. Such theories said he squinting, one suspects, at the anti-slavery agitation were subversive of the necessary powers of government.
Furthermore, there was "no process of reasoning by
which it could be demonstrated that the 'Act for the
Prevention of Intemperance, Pauperism and Crime' is
void, upon principles and theories outside the Constitution, which will not also, and by an easier induction,
bring it in direct conflict with the Constitution itself." 4s
The expansion of the Obligation of Contracts Clause
of Article I, section 10, by resort to Natural Law concepts follows a similar, though briefer course. The master craftsman was Chief Justice Marshall, and this time
the infusion of the constitutional clause with Natural
Law concepts was direct. The great leading case was
Fletcher v. Peck,49 in which, in 1810, Marshall, speaking
for the Court, held that a state legislature was forbidden
"either by general principles, which are common to our
free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
constitution of the United States" 50 to rescind a previous
land grant; while Justice Johnson based his concurring
opinion altogether "on the reason and nature of things;
48

49
50

Id. at 392.
6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162 (1810).
Id., 6 Cranch at 139.
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a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity." 51
It is true that when, in 1819, the doctrine of Fletcher v.
Peck was extended to the charters of eleemosynary corporations, the Court contented itself with invoking only
the Obligations Clause.52 The dependence, however, of
the holding on Natural Law premises still remains. The
constitutional clause presupposes a pre-existent obligation to be protected. Whence, if not from Natural Law,
can such an obligation descend upon a public grant?
Of the four great doctrines of American Constitutional
Law which the American judiciary developed prior to
the Civil War, three (the doctrine of judicial review, the
substantive doctrine of due process of law, and the doctrine that the Obligation of Contracts Clause protects
public contracts) are products of the infusion of the
documentary Constitution with Natural Law, natural
rights concepts. The fourth doctrine, that of dual federalism, was the creation of the Supreme Court at Washington under the presidency and guidance of Chief Justice Taney. It, of course, rests on different, highly political considerations. Yet even in this case, Natural Law
may claim some credit if, as Thomas Hill Green argues
in his Principles of Political Obligation,53 the notion of
sovereignty is also, in final analysis, rooted in the doctrine of Natural Law. Green, of course, was thinking
of "sovereignty" as it is known to Western political

52

Id., 6 Cranch at 143.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).

58

GRzEN, Principles of Political Obligation (1901)
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thought, not the kind of sovereignty that is the offspring
of Byzantine absolutism married to Marxian materialism.
IV. The Bench and Bar Present Us With an
Up-to-Date Doctrine of Natural Law
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the
Constitution. The first section of it reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
The fifth and final section gave Congress the power "to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
Article."
In the understanding of most people at the time, the
intended beneficiaries of the Amendment were the recently emancipated freedmen, but in the very first cases
to reach the Supreme Court under it, the famous
Slaughter House Cases 54 of 1873, this assumption was
sharply challenged by counsel, John Archibald Campbell
of New Orleans, a former Justice of the Court. No
doubt, Campbell argued, the freedmen would and should
54 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873).
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derive benefit from the Amendment, but their doing so
would only be incidental to the realization of its much
broader purpose, that of giving legal embodiment to the
principle of "laissez-faire individualism which had been
held by the colonists ever since they came to this soil." 55

"What," he asked, "did the colonists and their posterity
seek for and obtain by their settlement of this continent . . . ? Freedom, free action, free enterprise - free
competition. It was in freedom they expected to find the
best auspices for every kind of human success." 56
Campbell lost his suit, by the narrow margin of five
Justices to four; but he had sown an idea which, in the
course of the next thirty years, imparted to judicial review a new and revolutionary extension. In 1878, the
American Bar Association was founded from the elite of
the American Bar. Organized as it was in the wake of
the "barbarous" decision - as one member termed it in Munn v. Illinois,5 7 in which the Supreme Court had

held that states were entitled by virtue of their police
power to prescribe the charges of "businesses affected
with a public interest," the Association, through its more
eminent members, became the mouthpiece of a new constitutional philosophy which was compounded in about
equal parts from the teachings of the British Manchester
School of Political Economy and Herbert Spencer's
highly sentimentalized version of the doctrine of evolu55 These words are from Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution 53
(1942).
58 Id. at 54, quoting Campbell's Brief, pp. 42-4. Emphasis supplied.
57 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
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tion, just then becoming the intellectual vogue; plus a
"booster" - in the chemical sense - from Sir Henry
Maine's Ancient Law, first published in 1861. I refer
to Maine's famous dictum that "the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract." 58 If hitherto, why not henceforth?
In short, the American people were presented a new
doctrine of Natural Law, the content and purport of
which appear - to take a specific example - in Professor William Graham Sumner's What Social Classes Owe
to Each Other, which was published in 1883. I quote a
passage or two: 59
A society based on contract is a society of free
and independent men, who form ties without favor
or obligation, and cooperate without cringing or
intrigues. A society based on contract, gives the
utmost room and chance for individual development, and for all the self-reliance and dignity of a
free man . . . It follows that one man, in a free
state, cannot claim help from, and cannot be
charged to give help to, another.
And again:
All institutions are to be tested by the degree to
which they guarantee liberty. It is not to be admitted for a moment that liberty is a means to social
ends, and that it may be impaired for major considerations. Any one who so argues has lost the
58 MAINE, Ancient Law 165
59 Extracted from MASON,

(1949).

(3d Amer. ed. 1873).
Free Government in the Making 607-8
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bearing and relations of all the facts and factors in
a free state. He is a centre of powers to work, and
of capacities to suffer. What his powers may be whether they can carry him far or not; what his fortune may be, whether to suffer much or little - are
questions of his personal destiny which he must
work out and endure as he can; but for all that
concerns the bearing of the society and its institutions upon that man, and upon the sum of happiness to which he can attain during his life on earth,
the product of all history and all philosophy up to
this time is summed up in the doctrine, that he
should be left free to do the most for himself that
he can, and should be guaranteed the exclusive enjoyment of all that he does ...

Social improvement

is not to be won by direct effort. It is secondary and
results from physical or economic improvement .
An improvement in surgical instruments or in
anesthetics really does more for those who are not
well off than all the declamations of the orators and
pious wishes of the reformers

.

.

The yearning

after equality is the offspring of envy and covetousness, and there is no possible plan for satisfying that
yearning which can do aught else than rob A to
give to B; consequently all such plans nourish some
of the meanest vices of human nature, waste capital,
and overthrow civilization ....

It is interesting to compare this new type of Natural
Law, and its tremendous exaltation of individual effort,
with the ancient type, which was set forth in the texts
quoted in Section I of this paper. There are two differences, the first of which approximates that between a
moral code, addressed to the Reason, and "Natural Law"
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in the sense in which that term is employed by the natural sciences. The former operates through men; the
latter upon men, and altogether independently of their
attitude toward it, or even of their awareness of its existence. The results of its operation would therefore be of
no moral significance, except for one circumstance, the
assumption, to wit, that compliance with it - whether
conscious or unconscious - forwarded Progress. Thus,
according to Maine, it was "the progressive societies"
which had heretofore moved from status to contract;
while with Spencer progressive societies were destined to
"evolve" from the military state into the industrial society - a process not yet completed, however, or the
State would have vanished. In short, the laissez-faire
version of Natural Law contrived, in the end, to combine
the moral prestige of the older concept with the scientific prestige of the newer. 60
The second difference can be put more briefly, although it is perhaps the more important one. The Natural Law of Cicero, of St. Thomas, Grotius- even of
Locke - always conceives of man as in society. The
Natural Law of Spencer, Sumner, et al., sets man, the
supreme product of a highly competitive struggle for
existence, above society - an impossible station in both
logic and fact.
The chief constitutional law precipitate from the new
Natural Law, the doctrine of freedom of contract, con60 Parts of this paragraph are taken from
3, at 198.

CORWIN,

op. cit. supra note
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firms and illustrates this fatal characteristic of it. By this
doctrine, persons sui juris engaged in the ordinary employments were entitled to contract regarding their services without interference from government; as reciprocally were those who sought their services. Endorsed by
such writers as Cooley, Tiedemann, James Coolidge
Carter, J. F. Dillon, and by a growing procession of state
high courts headed by those of New York, Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts and Illinois, the doctrine attained culmin61
ating expression in 1905 in the famous Bakeshop Case.
There a New York statute which limited the hours of
labor in bakeries to ten hours a day and sixty hours a
week was set aside five justices to four as not "a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power
of the state" but "an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to
his personal liberty.... , 62
How was this result reached? Very simply: it was
the automatic result of the conception of an area of
individual action any interference with which by the
state put upon it a burden of justification not required
in other cases. On this basis the Court came to operate
a kind of "automatic" judicial review, the product of
which was labelled by its critics "mechanical jurisprudence." Nor is this type of jurisprudence extinct today,
as I shall now point out. Its application has merely been
transferred to a different set of values and interests.
61 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937
(1905).
62

Id., 198 U. S. at 56.
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V. Natural Law and Constitutional Law Today
In 1925, in the now famous Gitlow case, 63 which involved a conviction under the New York Anti-Syndicalist
Act, the Supreme Court adopted tentatively the thesis,
which it had rejected earlier, that the word "liberty" in
the Fourteenth Amendment adopts and makes effective
against state legislatures the limitations which the First
Amendment imposes upon Congress in favor of "freedom of speech and press." Then in 1940 in the Cantwell case,6 4 the Court upset a conviction under Connecticut law of two Jehovah's Witnesses for breach of
the peace on the ground that the proselyting activities of
the said Witnesses did not under the circumstances constitute a "clear and present danger" to public order; and
since then a majority of the Court has gone to the verge,
at least, of making the "clear and present danger" formula a direct test of legislation, although in the Gitlow
case it had rejected the rule as spurious.
And what has all this to do with Natural Law? The
answer is discovered when we note the rule by which the
Court professes to be guided when interpreting the word
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment in the light of
the Bill of Rights. Not all the provisions of the latter are
regarded as having been converted by the Fourteenth
Amendment into restrictions on the states, but only those
that are protective of the "immutable principles of jus63 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138
(1925).

64 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed.
1213 (1940).
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tice which inhere in the very idea of free government";
of the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"; of the "immunities... implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"; of principles of justice "rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people"; principles, the
violation of which would be "repugnant to the conscience
of mankind." "
This is entirely in line with the Natural Law tradition.
But does it suffice to elevate the rights it deals with into
a super-constitution, so that any law touching them is
ipso facto "infected with presumptive invalidity"? As
we have seen, this is precisely what happened in the case
of "liberty of contract"; and today, "liberty of contract"
thus distended "is all," as they say in Pennsylvania; and
may not a like fate overtake freedom of speech, press,
and religion in time if the same slide-rule methods are
applied to legislation touching them? I am thinking
especially of such decisions as those in Saia v. New
York, 6 McCollum v. Board of Education,6 7 and Terminiello v. City of Chicago.6s These were very ill-considered decisions to my way of thinking, and in fact the
65 Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 470-72, 67 C. Ct. 374, 91 L.
Ed. 422 (1947), quoting from Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389, 18
S. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1898); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316,
47 S. Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270 (1926); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U. S.97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934).
66 334 U. S. 558, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948).
e7 333 U. S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
68 ......
U. S .......
69 S. Ct. 894 (1949).
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first of these has already been repudiated by the Court,69
at least four of the five Justices who were responsible for
it lugubriously so assert. I contend, in short, that any
patent formula or device which relieves the Justices from
considering relevant, however recalcitrant facts, or which
exonerates them of the characteristic judicial duty of
adjusting the universal and eternal to the local and contingent, the here and the now, is to be deplored. I contend further that the "clear and present danger" rule is
just such a patent formula.
How are we to assess the importance of the Natural
Law concept in the development of American Constitutional Law?- What it all simmers down to is essentially
this: while that distinctive American institution, judicial
review, is regarded today as stemming from the principle
of popular sovereignty, it sprang in the first instance
from "common right and reason," the equivalent with
men of law in the Sixteenth Century England of "Natural Law." What is more, popular sovereignty in the
last analysis is itself a derivative from the Natural Law
postulate, being neither more nor less than a sort of
ad hoc consolidation of the natural right of human beings to choose their own governing institutions.
And the indebtedness of American Constitutional Law
to Natural Law, natural rights concepts for its content
in the field of private rights is vital and well-nigh allcomprehensive. It is, of course, true that not all of the
80 The reference is to Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 17, 69 S. Ct. 448
(1949).
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corollaries that the courts have endeavored to attach to
their premises have survived; and few have survived
without modification. Yet it is a striking fact that while
hundreds of constitutional provisions have been adopted
since judicial review was established, not one has ever
proposed its abolition and only very few its modification.
And meantime the American states have continued to incorporate in their successive constitutions, virtually without comment, the constitutional clauses- the Due Process Clause, for example- that today incorporate the
principal judicial doctrines which I have traced to Natural Law bases. It is true, as I just remarked, that some
of these doctrines have become extinct and others have
been qualified; but invariably these results have been
achieved by judicial massage, as it were - sometimes a
rather rugged massage - and not by legislative or constitutional surgery.
Not that the doctrine of Natural Law itself has
escaped disturbing comment at times, even from American jurists. Frequently cited in this connection is the
late Justice Holmes' discourse on "Natural Law." "It is
not enough," said Justice Holmes in a characteristic passage, "for the knight of romance that you agree that his
lady is a very nice girl, - if you do not admit that she
is the best that God ever made, you must fight"; and the
same demand, he opines, "is at the bottom of the jurist's
search for criteria of absolute validity." 70
We can readily concede that such citeria may never
70 HOLMES, Collected Legal Papers 310 (Laski ed. 1920).
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be established in this far from perfect, and always changing world. Yet that admission does not necessarily discredit the search; perhaps, indeed, it makes it more
necessary, as an alternative to despair. Holmes, in fact,
exposes himself when he goes on to advance as an argument against Natural Law that the right to life "is sacrificed without a scruple whenever the interest of society,
that is, of the predominant power of the community, is
thought to demand it." 71 But the answer is plain: The
right to life is more than the right to live - it is also the
right to spend life for worthwhile ends; and so long as
one is guaranteed a free man's part in determining what
these ends are, Natural Law has pro tanto received institutional recognition and embodiment. But, of course,
it is essential to this argument that the free man's part
be kept a really vital one.
Our present interest, however, has been in Natural
Law as a challenge to the notion of unlimited human
authority. American Constitutional Law is the record
of an attempt to implement that challenge. The record
is a somewhat mixed one, but it is clear that in the judgment of the American people it has been on the whole a
record of successes. May it continue to be!

71 Id. at 314.
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Honorary Consultant, Library of Congress).

THE NATURAL LAW AND CANON LAW
1.-In the inquiry about Natural Law which forms the
object of our discussions, we have been proceeding by
what I believe a highly constructive method: approaching, as it were, in a spectral analysis the central problems connected with the concept and function of Natural
Law from the various angles as presented by the specific
problems existing in various given legal orders: Constitutional, Common, International Law. Most appropriately
so: for the science of Natural Law, like all knowledge
in the realm of practical reason, deals with human acts
and cannot be construed, more geometrico, in an abstract,
strictly speculative fashion, i.e. without the empirical
data of actual human relations and social compounds.
The concept of Natural Law, it is true, taken in its strict
sense as the principles which are immediately given by
the rational and social nature of man, has its own reality,
"exists" in the intellectual order in the manner of Universals; yet in the practical order it can exercize a normative function as regula et mensura only by some relation
to the contingencies of man's social existence here and
now: 1 and these contingencies are many and changeable.
They are the subject matter of positive law in all its va1 Cf. J. Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la sociiti (Legons de
droit naturel I; 3 ed. Namur-Louvain 1948) 55; H. Rommen, The Natural
Law (St. Louis-London 1948) 187, 216.
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riety and relativity, and it bespeaks the wisdom of the
mediaeval schoolmen that they were satisfied with philosophizing about the essential relations of all positive law
to the natural, rather than dreaming of a Natural Law
which would rule human social behavior once for all as
a perfect code in minute detail, and thus make all positive
law superfluous by absorption; or rather than removing
Natural Law to the ever unattainable, rarified spheres of
a transcendental ideal. It is because of the real, we may
even say the necessary, correlation between the natural
and the positive order that a mode of inquiry which investigates the former through the data of the latter is
very much of the lawyer's, not only the philosopher's
concern.
2.-Because of this correlation we are entitled to speak
about Natural Law and Canon Law. In doing so, we are
inquiring not about the right reason of a given legal institution or set of rules concerning one partial aspect of
social relations, but about the right reason of a legal order
as a whole: a body of laws which considers the whole of
a society and its parts, its ultimate ends, partial ends, and
means, in their coherence and interconnections, and does
not seek or require its justification from any other scope
or form of social existence. Canon Law, the legal order of
the Catholic Church, comprises the principles and rules
governing the function of the Church as a social body of
its own right and with regard to its specific ends, which
cannot be absorbed by the ends of the body politic or of
any other society. Whatever the actual relations of
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Church and State in a given country - and they may be
persecution, indifference, separation, privileged status,
establishment, etc.- Canon Law is never a department
of any other legal order, because it transcends the order
of the state inasmuch as the spiritual existence of man is
not part of his civic existence. This remains true even
where Church government and political government coincide, as in the Papal States before 1870 and in the State
of Vatican City today; or where the political government,
by virtue of concordat or by encroachment, controls part
of the ecclesiastical life: neither the civil law of Vatican
City nor the state laws of a given country on matters
ecclesiastical are Canon Law.
I - The Church
3.-The existence of Canon Law is a unique phenomenon in the world of laws because of the unique nature
of the Church: a society of divine origin by its institution, yet human in its bearers of authority, which is a
stewardship of the divine authority of Christ Himself perpetuated; ordained towards a supranatural end and yet
organized in the form of a visible community with its
government, legislation, courts, means of enforcement,
property rights, diplomatic relations, etc.; empowered
with the administration of God's graces through the instrumentality of matter and form in the sacraments, the
Church is incommensurable with all other modes of social
existence.
It is necessary to realize the unique character of the
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Church in order to grasp the meaning of Canon Law.
There has been, through all ages, the voice of those who
contend that any legal order is contrary to a so-called
"true" conception of Christianity. The communion of
saints, they say, is an entirely spiritual fellowship of the
elect, incompatible with the concept of organization,
authority, law. There can be no other law but the bond
of charity, no other authority but the free breathing of
the Holy Spirit which guides the faithful in a holy, anarchical enthusiasm. Law, as a principle of obligation by
authority, is declared contrary to love. This conception
rests - it is perhaps not superfluous to repeat it - on a
misunderstanding of all terms used. The notion of law is
narrowed down and depreciated, because all law is here
conceived as an arbitrary, voluntaristic command (in the
legislator); as pertaining merely to the base world of
material goods and relations (in the object); as being
obeyed only in compulsion and fear (in the subject).
Correspondingly, the absolute dematerialization of the
concept of the Church into a mental attitude, a common
feeling of spiritual union, opens up an unbridgeable
chasm between religious and social existence, between the
spiritual and the created world. It must ultimately lead
to the denial of the unity of being, of the reality of the
sacraments, and of the hypostatic union of the two natures
in Christ.
On the other side, we should not forget that there is
also the opposite danger of overstressing the social form
at the expense of the supranatural end on which the
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Church is founded. This trend may be observed, e.g., in
the early Middle Ages, when parishes, abbeys, and bishoprics came more and more to be considered as objects of
a quasi-feudal tenure in which the spiritual office was reduced to a mere appurtenance of the material rights of
the incumbent, until the Gregorian reform restored the
canonical concept of sacred offices. Or we may cite the
curialism of the late Middle Ages, in which the vast apparatus of papal administration degenerated into a bureaucratic, legalistic, fiscal machinery functioning for its
own material ends, and thus contributed to precipitate the
great crises of the conciliar movement and the ultimate
breakdown of Christian unity in the Protestant revolution.
4.-I have contrasted the excesses of spiritualism and
legalism in order to make understood the complex and
unique nature of Canon Law. The problem of Natural
Law and Canon Law has, consequently, certain aspects
which elsewhere are not found, or not found in a like
manner. This is true, first, of a very fundamental question that is easily overlooked when the congenital difference of the Church's legal order from any secular legal
order is not kept in mind: namely the question of how it
it possible to speak of a natural law in an order which
by its origin, first principles, and ends, belongs to the
sphere of the supranatural. Is there not a serious difficulty of measuring the incommensurable? The question
leads to a number of interesting observations:
(a) There is no doubt that the supranatural cannot
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be explained by, or deduced from the natural. The supreme jurisdiction of the Pope as the Vicar of Christ, as
well as his power to define theological truth and command its acceptance with a binding force for every Catholic conscience, are not within the grasp of natural reason.
Nor is the power of bishops to confer orders; nor the fact
that through the ministry of men, namely priests, sins can
be forgiven; nor that there should be any difference of
rights between the laity and the clergy, and within the
clergy, a hierarchical gradation of (sacramental) powers
of orders, or of powers of jurisdiction. And yet, the whole
body of Canon Law rests on such supranatural foundations, which can be accepted by reason only when reason,
in the act of faith, accepts the fact of divine revelation
as the source of the constitutive law of the Church. In
other words, in the law governing ecclesiastical society,
there is a fundamental part, the "divine positive law,"
which is beyond natural law even as the very end of the
Church, the eternal salvation of souls, is beyond the
natural faculties of man. But what is beyond nature is
not therefore contrary to, or destructive of nature: the
identity of God the Creator and God the author of the
economy of salvation precludes the possibility of any contradiction between the supranatural and the natural
order. Faith is not irrational, theology does not nullify
philosophy; the supranatural law presupposes, includes,
and perfects the Natural Law. 2 It is no paradox, then, if
we say that in the supranatural elements of the Church's
2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica 2.1 q. 99 art. 2 ad 1.
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constitution the Natural Law reappears, as it were, on a
higher plane and remains valid. For example, a person
not having the use of reason could not become Pope;
nobody can be validly ordained against his will; a confessor cannot impose the commission of a crime or the fulfillment of impossible acts as penance; there can be no
sacrament of marriage between infants, etc.
(b) Upon the supranatural foundation, the law of the
Church is built in detail by the proper ecclesiastical authority which, by definition, is a human agency though
instituted by divine law. Ecclesiastical laws are manmade, and while ultimately ordained for the better
attainment of the supranatural end of the ecclesiastical
society, (hence, sacri canones), they are not supranatural as means towards this end. Nor are they always
directly connected with the end of salvation. In order to
fulfill its supreme mission, the Church can and must also
provide for the proper functioning of the social body as
such, e.g. for the lawful and honest administration of the
material means she needs; for the just and orderly settlement, by forms of legal procedure, of conflicts between
the members of the society; for the protection of honor
and legitimate personal rights (e.g. the right to separation of bed and board; the observation of forms in the
removal of pastors, etc.). Positive ecclesiastical law,
therefore, in its object is not restricted to a mere fillingout of details of the divine institution (hierarchy and
sacraments) ; but it also regulates matters that in any way
are reasonably connected with the preservation of those
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common and individual interests which in the natural
order belongs to the being of the Church as a society.3
All such law, like human law in general, results from historical growth under changing historical conditions: it is
changeable, it may fail of its purpose, it may prove an
outright mistake, or become impractical by later developments. There can be little doubt about the role which
the dictates of natural reason have to play as a rule and
measure in making and applying such positive ecclesiastical law.4
5.-Another singular aspect characteristic of Canon
Law in its relation to Natural Law consists in the possibilities for the Church to realize the unity of the moral
and the legal order. The fact that all genuine law, secular or ecclesiastical, is part of the wider realm of the
moral order is not under discussion here. But it is also
clear that the legal norm and the legal judgment, in that
it measures the human act primarily in its external, social
relevance, is narrower in its scope than the moral judgment, for which the social value of acts is only one, and
not the foremost criterion. For instance, (a) the act of
the will which does not manifest itself in the outer world
remains beyond the reach of the legal order; (b) even an
8 Contra

P. Fedele, Discorso generale sull'ordinamento canonico (Pa-

dua 1941); but see A. Van Hove, Prolegomena (Commentarium Lovaniense
in Codicem iuris canonici 1.1; 2 ed. Malines-Rome 1945) 45, 61 n. 3.
4 Examples for historical change in positive laws that are destined to
fill out the divine law are amply supplied in the history of papal elections;
or of the form prescribed by the Church for a valid sacramental marriage.
As to laws of a purely social content, one may recall the historical changes
in the canonical rules of court procedure.
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act or fact in the external world (and which therefore
falls under the rule of the substantive law) remains practically beyond the reach of the legal order if it cannot
be ascertained by sufficient evidence according to adjective law, or if it is not actionable (e.g. where the doctrine
of estoppel applies); (c) legal effects may result from
the mere verification of conventional formal requirements
(as, e.g., in a promissory note; in judgment by default; in
presumptions and fictions of law).
In such cases of discrepancy between legality and morality, the limitations of every legal order become evident.
But while the power of secular society stops at this point,
the Church's authority reaches beyond it. (a) It includes
the authority to teach dogmatic and moral truth in a
binding manner, which creates a true obligation for the
faithful to accept the teaching-the power of magisterium, which belongs to the hierarchy - so that moral
precepts may even take the form of positive law.5 (b) It
includes the power of jurisdiction over human acts in the
internal sphere, the "court of conscience," of which the
administration of the sacrament of penance is the foremost, but not the only application. (This power is jurisdiction not only in a figurative or analogous manner of
speech. Note that valid sacramental absolution requires
powers of order and jurisdiction, which latter is given
either by law or delegated by concession from the legiti5 For example, Codex iuris canonici (1917) canons 124, 415 § 5,
643 § 2, 892 §2, etc. (in subsequent tootnotes, references to the Code of
1917 will be given by canon and number only). Cf. P. Ciprotti, Lezioni di
diritto canonico (Padua 1943) 41, 62f.
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mate authority. 6 ) Now, in the confessor's power to bind
and loose, the absolute measure applied is the moral
norm, and while the essential effect here regards the relation between the individual and God (regardless of
whether the matter of the norm is a duty towards God,
self, or other men), thus transcending the legal order, it
is in many respects connected with the external sphere of
law: Canon Law regulates the valid exercise of internal
jurisdiction; the internal forum safeguards the observation in conscience of the norms of Canon Law; absolution

from, or retention of sin touches upon the baptized individual's right to the reception of all other sacraments; an
obligation imposed in the internal forum (e.g., restitution
of ill-gotten gains or rights) can restore the social order
where the external power of law is ineffective (e.g., because of lack of proof) ; sacramental absolution from censures imposed judicially or by operation of law has certain
effects in the external forum."
Through the magisterium, and in the internal forum,
wide avenues for the realization of Natural Law are opened to the Church's jurisdictional power. For, the natural
moral law is one (lex naturalis);moral norms which deal
with the matter of just social relations (ius naturale) are
an integral part of it: the possibility of conflict between
6 Canon 872ff. The Pope and the Roman Cardinals hold this jurisdiction by law for the universal Church; bishops, pastors, and certain other
priests, for a limited territory; and certain religious superiors, for their
own subjects (can. 873).
T Cf. can. 2251. For the effects in the external forum of certain (nonsacramental) dispensations given in the internal forum see can. 1047.
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morality and law, as it exists on all levels of the positive
legal order, is cancelled on the level of the natural order.
Hence, in all matters of what is morally due between man
and society, the authoritative interpretation of moral
truth (magisterium) includes interpretation of Natural
Law; equally the overriding of all legal limitations and
formalisms by the moral judgment in the court of conscience becomes application of Natural Law.
II. -

Natural Law

6.-From all our preceding observations it becomes
understandable that the problems of Natural Law have
at all times been of vital interest for canonical thought.
It is not by coincidence that the scholastic philosophy of
the thirteenth century is largely indebted to the spadework done by the preceding generations of canonists on
the doctrine of Natural Law. The opening section of the
book which marks the beginning of a science of Canon
Law, the Concordia discordantium canonum of the Bolognese monk Gratian (c. 1140 A.D.)-the book which
for centuries was to remain the definitive compilation of
the ancient and early mediaeval strata of Canon Law, and
which for the first time subjected the immense mass of
canonical legislative materials to the scientific principles
of analysis and discovery-is dedicated to a discussion of
natural and positive law. On the basis of his somewhat
imperfect dicta the early commentators of Gratian's text
probed into nearly all the aspects of the problem which
were to become topical with the schoolmen: the concept
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of Natural Law, the various meanings in which the term
is often loosely employed; the place of Natural Law in the
structure of the human mind; its contents, application,
and relation to man-made law; how its immutability,
universality, indispensability, and normative function are
to be understood; how it operates in the fundamental
data of social life, etc. The wealth of the pertinent contributions of the early canonists, especially in the century
preceding St. Thomas, is to the present day far from being fully explored and analyzed, although the fact of their
early leadership in the field is not unknown. 8 For the
degree to which later generations of canonists (after the
leadership had passed to philosophy and theology) were
conversant with all the facets of the doctrine of Natural
Law, every major treatise on Canon Law through the
centuries bears witness.
It could, indeed, not be otherwise. The secular lawyer
should not, but can, unfortunately, be forgetful of the
existence of a metaphysical order of being: confiding
blindly in the forces of convention, political balance and
all the external props and stays of the secular orderwhich indeed may seem strong enough at times to make
states function (though badly and aimlessly) -he may
be tempted to be satisfied with the working hypothesis of
8 An excellent beginning of studies in this field has been made by 0.
Lottin, Le droit naturl chez St. Thomas d'Aquin et ses pridcessseurs (2
ed. Bruges 1931). A full investigation of the historical problems involved
would also have to take into account the teachings of the mediaeval authors
on civil law, cf. G. Onclin, "Le droit naturel chez les Romanistes des XIIe
et XIIIe si~cles," Miscellanea moralia in honorem A. Janssen (Louvain
1948) II, 329-37.
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legal positivism and all the -isms derived from an agnostic
philosophy. The canon lawyer, if he were tempted to
think on such lines, or if he would consider Natural Law
only as an idealistic "postulate" of his religious belief,9
would find himself in an empty abyss, because the Church
cannot even be thought without the reality of an ontological order. If natural reason does not exist, or if it is
unable to form valid judgments on moral truth, then the
entire supranatural order becomes either a tyrannical
whim of God or a figment of the human mind; the
Church, consequently, would become a social entity which
exists either by irrational magic, or as a brazen lie; in
either case it would have no reality as Church. Positivism
is, therefore, per se impossible in Canon Law.' 0
7.-Equally impossible for Canon Law is any proposition which conceives of Natural Law in a purely "naturalistic" or "rationalistic" sense; i.e. which either supposes
that human nature is altogether opposed to, and logically
and historically antecedent to reason and social order (the
theological properties of Adam's "natural" state before
the Fall are not in question this theory) ; or that human
reason is entirely self-determined, self-sufficient, unrelated
to, or even opposed to religion. For the canonist, human
9 This is, surprisingly, the attitude of H. Singer, "Das Naturrecht im
Codex juris canonici," Archiv fi;r Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 16
(1922-3) 206-15.
10 The maxim sanctioned by Pope Boniface VIII, "The Roman Pontiff is considered to have all laws in the shrine of his heart" (Liber Sextus
1.2.1) does not imply any shade of positivism, but expresses the doctrine

that the Pope always acts in full knowledge of the law; cf. F. Gillman, in
Archiv fir katholisches Kirchenrecht 92 (1912) 3-17.
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nature cannot be but rational and social; and rational
nature (or natural reason) in man cannot be but created.
This statement, we must emphasize, does not require an
act of supranatural faith: although it becomes inescapable
in the light of faith, it remains attainable on the level of
the philosophical principle of causality which admits an
uncaused cause of being. Otherwise, Natural Law would
not be knowable to man without faith.
The power of natural reason to form judgments in the
practical order, i.e. to proceed from the "is" to the
"ought" stems from the ultimate cause of reason; the act
of reason (the judgment) does not make, but find what
is right. Both as a cognitive principle and a normative
rule and measure Natural Law refers back, therefore, to
the author of the objective order of things and of the rational nature of man. In this sense we have to understand
all formulations which speak of the Natural Law as "inborn," "laid into," "impressed upon" the human heart or
mind; or as "participation of human reason" in the eternal law governing the Universe. Without going into details about the differentiation between the neo-PlatonicAugustinian tradition behind the notion of "imprint" and
the Aristotelian-thomistic conception of "participation,"' 1
we can perceive the convergence of both in their stating
the divine origin of Natural Law; i.e. in stating Natural
Law as that part or mode of divine law which, without
requiring supranatural revelation, is within the ken of, or
11 Cf. Lottin, op. cit. n. 8 supra, 68ff.
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co-natural to, human reason-a corollary to the possibility of a natural knowledge of God.
The double dichotomy, divine (natural or positive)human ecclesiastical law, has thus become the fundamental frame, almost from the beginning of canonistic
science, for describing the sum total of law governing the
Church. I say, almost from the beginning: because clearness in distinguishing the natural from the supranatural
divine order was not immediately achieved. In the opening sentences of Gratian's work we read that "Natural
Law is what is contained in the Law [of the Old Covenant] and the Gospel: whereby each is bidden to do unto
others what he wants done to himself, and forbidden to
inflict upon others what he wants not to be done to himself; wherefore Christ says in the Gospel

. . ."

Though

farther on Gratian redefines his concept and speaks of
Natural Law which "begins with the beginning of rational
creatures" ;12 he insists that not all commandments of the
Old and the New Testament are of Natural Law, 13 and
differentiates somehow between the "divine laws" and the
"canon of scriptures,"' 1 4 his terminology of natural and

divine laws remains always fluctuating. Only gradually
did the next generations of canonists arrive at the correct
interpretation: eventually they recognized that precepts
of the natural moral law are included in the revelation
of the Old and the New Testament not by way of reveal12 Gratian, Decretum, dist. 5 prin.
13 Ibid. dist. 6 fin.
14 Ibid. dist. 9 fin.
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ing supranatural truth; i.e. that the quality of Natural
Law as natural is not due to revelation but to reason. 15
III -

The Function of Natural Law

8.-Divine natural, divine positive, human ecclesiastical law: only when we proceed to determine their functional relation, when we leave the field of abstract definitions and enter the much more complex field of practical
realizations of Natural Law in the juridical order, can we
grasp the all-important fact that the Natural Law doctrine is not a mere theory of a static, rigid, hierarchical
structure of legal orders, but a living force in the legal life
of the Church. What does it mean, we must ask, that
Natural Law (as we read in every text book) has the force
of law (viget) in the Church; that human positive law
cannot prevail against it (or else, it ceases to be law);
that statutory law is to be made, interpreted, and applied
in accordance with it? Both a guiding ("in-forming")
and a critical function is assigned to Natural Law in such
statements; and all the more one must be on guard against
the idea as though Natural Law were a code of hard and
fast rules, existing, as it were, on the second story of the
building above the first floor of positive law. If we ask
what Natural Law contains and how it is knowable; if
we further ask whether the legal order of the Church
15 Cf. the texts quoted by Lottin, op. cit. 13-23; 105-111. But note that
Pope Gregory IX as late as 1234 uses the term "natural law" as synonymous with "divine law," and as distinct from the dictates of reason: Decretales 1.4.11; cf. Van Hove, De consuetudine (Commentarium Lovaniense

1.3; 1933) 81ff.
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may more directly and eminently "bring out," or "realize" this or that aspect of Natural Law, we must always
be on guard against such "positivism of Natural Law"or else the canonist might easily be led to take the textbooks and case books of moral theology for the Natural
Law, a sort of super-code. This is no less a danger than
the opposite notion of Natural Law as a merely formal
"postulate" without any material contents. 16
The observation is age-old that in Natural Law not all
judgments, or precepts, or rights are evident to the same
degree. Between the absolutely good and the absolutely
evil act there is the immense sphere of the "relative," the
indifferent, the contingent, and the complex, where the
simple statement that the act acquires its goodness or
badness from its end leads only to the further question of
proper ends, proper means, and how to establish a right
relation in the multitude of ends, values, interests, goods,
and rights. The judgment of right reason is therefore
anything but a judgment of "simple reason," unless we
want to restrict the subject matter of Natural Law to
what is evident to children, or self-evident. Man as man
is never in the absolute (as far as the law is concerned)
but always in concrete relations. To judge whether the
concrete situation is just or unjust requires always a varying number of considerations and ratiocinations, for us to
perform. Some of these situations are given with social
life as such; but we must insist that even in regard to the
most fundamental, to Life itself, the Natural Law does
16G. Renard, La philosophie de 'institution (Paris 1939) 28ff.
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not consist of a simple formula, "killing is bad," "notkilling is good." What about self-defense? Just war?
Capital punishment? Would we not reject, e.g., a legal
order as against Natural Law which excludes the right of
self-defense? Both the fifth commandment and selfdefense are of Natural Law; yet defense can be excessive (as in the case of a harmless aggressor; of a trifling
object; of inadequate weapons) ; again, the excess may be
caused by overwhelming fright, etc. The ratio naturalis
consists of one all-comprehensive judgment only, but in a
given case its formulation may rest on a chain of conclusions which positive law will have to express by a number
of rules and exceptions. It cannot be said, e.g., that of the
different treatment given by different penal codes to excess in self-defense, one or the other must be "against"
Natural Law. And the more we get away from the fundamental facts and forms of life into the relations existing
in highly organized society, the more the technical, conventional regulation enters into the proper determination
of wrong and right. What is Natural Law in regard to
the buying and selling of shares on the stock-exchange?
Or to the ordination of a cleric outside his home diocese?
It would be folly to expect in such situations a detailed
answer from "pure" Natural Law, or to say that a given
set of rules in such situations is the only possible determination of Natural Law.
The functional relation of Natural Law and positive
law may perhaps be best expressed thus: the closer a legal
situation or institution is to the fundamental facts of hu-
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man social life, the greater becomes the evidence of Natural Law; the more contingencies are involved, the more
must be left to positive determination of the legislator,
which in itself has the value of securing social stability,
whereas leaving the determination to individual reasoning would destroy the end of society as an order. Every
honest and sincere attempt of the lawmaker to rule in a
manner consistent with the end and meaning of a given
institution, with the implied possibilities of a given situation for the end of society itself, is still "of" Natural Law,
"within" Natural Law.' 7 The "participation" of positive
law in Natural Law is a participation by "non-contradiction," and also by a process of approximation, which includes the notion of perfectibility, of the openness of
reason towards better reason.' 8 Natural Law remains one
and universal in all its infinite diversifications; but our
grasp of it can grow the more we are able to express the
universal by a formula which covers the particular.
9.-This differentiation of degrees of evidence of Natural Law has been expressed in many ways in the history of
canonical and philosophical or theological thought. The
17 For instance, duress vitiates every act somehow in Natural Law. But
the act may in positive law be valid and rescindible (can. 103 § 2); valid
and partially rescindible (thus in Holy Orders received under duress, can.
214); or invalid (thus in matrimony, can. 1087). In delicts committed
under duress, imputability may be excluded (can. 2205 § 2; 2229 § 2), diminished (can. 2205 § 3), or fully sustained (can. 2229 § 3 n.3).
18 For instance, antecedent impot,.nce is a marriage impediment of
Natural Law; yet the Roman Church preferred till the twelfth century the
"custom" according to which in this case the couple, once married, was
bound to continue common life "as brother and sister."

104

NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE

PROCEEDINGS

early canonists contrasted the "precepts and prohibitions"
with the mere "demonstrations" or "permissive Natural
Law;" again the distinctions of necessary and convenient,
mandatory and advisory, antecedent and hypothetical
Natural Law are found. Such antinomies as "by Natural
Law everything is common"-"by Natural Law there is
property of individuals" led to a great variety of solutions: authors spoke of an original communism before the
Fall versus the later division of mine and thine (here we
have even Natural Law referred to a primordial "natural state") ; or they referred the first proposition to the
state of necessity, when all becomes common by Natural Law, etc. 19 All such distinctions are of great heuristic value; so is in particular the thomistic formula for
Natural Law. Starting from the analogy of speculative
reasoning, St. Thomas finds in Natural Law certain
first principles on the level of self-evident propositions,
wherefrom secondary conclusions are deducible, and
so on down to those rules which are left to be determined by the legislator's prudence in positive law. 20 But
one should note that St. Thomas insists that the syllogisms
of practical reason are not of the same cogency as those
in the speculative field. Recent French theologians have
warned very appropriately against forgetting that the
thomistic formula of first principles and secondary con19 Cf. the texts in Lottin, op. cit.; especially Huguccio (ibid. 110) ; also
the Glossa ordinaria on Gratian dist. 1 c.7 v. communis omnium.-W. J.
McDonald, "Communism in Eden?" New Scholasticism 20 (1946) 101-25.
20 Summa theol. 2.1. q.94 art.2, q.95 art.2. The distinction is to a certain extent anticipated in St. Albert's trichotomy, essential-suppositive-particular, ef. Lottin, op. cit. 46, 118.
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clusions was coined as a heuristic method of analogy and
21
does not denote degrees in the being of Natural Law.
10.-Can we deduce from such formulae as "approximation," "degrees of evidence," "principles and conclusions," etc. any guidance for the legislator and for the
jurist? The following points seem to be of especial importance:
(a) the principle of caution against absolute fixations whenever the dictate of natural reason is not
absolutely evident. The test of a law (of its being
"informed" by, "participating" in, Natural Law)
lies not in the normal cases contemplated by the lawmaker, but in the unusual, the unforeseen, the extreme possibilities. The more the law provides for
the contingency of the unforeseen by a flexible rule,
the closer will it be to Natural Law. Also the general
maxims (regulae juris) which jurisprudential experience since Roman times has helped to formulate as
means of guidance for interpretation of law, are
never to be taken as definite fixations; they can fail
in the particular case, admit of exceptions; and already the wisdom of the ancients warned that "'non
ex regula ius sumatur, sed ex jure quod est regula
fiat."2

2

Each rule is an abstraction and has itself a

high validity as approximating natural reason, but
21 Cf. Lottin 103; Leclercq, op. ch. n. supra, 59-61; Renard, op. cit. n.
16 supra, pasim.
22 Digest 50.17.1.
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precisely in its general formulation lies the danger of
doing injustice to the individual, irregular contingency. The perfect balance of natural justice is not
reached when the general is mistaken for the universal.
(b) the principle of finalistic, instead of formalistic thinking. The lawgiver (and the jurist as well
who applies the law) has to determine his conclu23
sions by considering the end of a given institution,
the intrinsic "logique de l'institution" on which he
rules (natura rerum); and equally the end of the
legal order itself, the common good. The canonist,
in particular, will have to look even beyond the common good and the stability of order in ecclesiastical
society, towards a supreme end, the salvation of souls.
11.-If we contemplate Canon Law in its history and as
it is at present embodied in the Code of 1917, we find
that the canonists' concern about making the positive
serve the Natural Law is something very real. Canonical
legislation has been historically leading, e.g., in assigning
legal force to informal agreements which were not actionable under the forms required for contracts by the civil
law; or in enforcing the right to self-determination in
choosing one's spouse, as against parental domination or
restrictions of status. In its utmost care to have penal
23 For the various interesting approaches of the twelfth-century writers
on civil law in discussing this problem, see E. M. Meijers, "Le conflit entre
1'6quit6 et la loi chez les premiers glossateurs," Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgesehiedenis 17 (1940) 117-35.

NATURAL LAW AND CANON LAW

liability never go beyond the inner moral responsibility,
today the Code goes farther than the most secular legislations by considering, e.g., ignorance of law as excluding
guilt, and any deficiency on the part of the will or the intellect as excusing from certain penalties.2 4 The constant
admonition of the Church to judges, that they impose
penalties as ultimate means of making discipline respected and of effecting emendation of the recalcitrant, rather
than as retribution, marks another point in which Canon
Law has led the way to principles of criminal justice
which by now have become the heritage of the legal civilization of the West.
We can hardly open a page in the Code without finding this concern for realizing ends that lie beyond legal
formalism; for limiting the normal effects of the law to
the normal cases and leaving an open margin for the
cases where "urgent need," "just cause," "reasonable
cause," "grave inconvenience," "spiritual danger," etc.
make the rigidity of the normal rule inappropriate for its
purpose. The very extent to which dispensation from the
common law is provided for as a corrective principle in
the legal order of the Church is a unique feature: again,
in this field we have the significant further "valve" that
in urgent cases a local authority might, without delegation, exercise rights of dispensing which belong to the
Holy See alone. 5 In the same vein we find such laws as
that which permits the administration of sacraments
24 Canons 2202, 2229.

23 Can. 81.
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even by an excommunicated priest in certain cases of
need.2 86 We find the legal construction of supplied jurisdiction in cases of common error-i.e., where jurisdictional acts are posited by a person commonly but erroneously believed to have jurisdictional power: the everlatent jurisdiction of the Church Universal is substituted
27
here to convalidate the act.
12.-Behind these examples we can see how strong the
ecclesiastical law-giver's wish is to achieve equity within
the canonical order, to establish the balance between
generalization and individualization that characterizes the
"right reason" of Natural Law. Particularly revealing is
one of the rules which the Code gives to the judge in cases
where he is called upon to fill a possible lacuna of the positive law, to substitute for the legislator: he has to proceed according to the general principles of law applied
with canonical equity, i.e. tempered with the equity proper to Canon Law. 28 This is not a mere rhetorical formula
but a clear statement which says: not in the general rule
alone, nor in a subjective, vague individualism alone, but
only in the interpenetration of two apparently contradictory principles can the judge discover what is the true law
in the case-: an unusual situation, to be sure, but precise26

Can. 2261.

27 Can. 209. On the antecedents of this rule in Roman Law, cf. F. A.

Wilches, De errore communi in iure romano et canonico (Rome 1940).
28 Can. 20. The rule has been amply discussed among recent authors;
for the numerous problems involved see in particular Ch. Lefebvre, Les
poswoirs du jug* en droit canonique (Paris 1938); G. Michiels, Normae
generales juris canonici (2 ed. Paris-Tournai-Rome 1949), I, 608-25.
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ly as such a guide to the "mind of the legislator." Equity
as a remedial norm of natural justice for the judge in his
application of the law is mentioned several times in the
Code; it is generally understood as a principle of interpretation, and has historically influenced English Equity
in its origins. Equity, finally, can in exceptional circumstances effect the non-application of positive law (epikeia): when the latter, in a given case, would lead to defeating its own end (i.e. lead to a result contrary to the
lawgiver's will), it becomes unreasonable and must by
Natural Law cease to bind. In urgent cases, with all due
caution, even the individual is allowed to solve such a
conflict, i.e. to decide that the lawgiver, had he foreseen
the situation, would not have included it in the general
rule.
13.-We may thus say that Canon Law, by its eminently supple, flexible features, is particularly close to Natural
Law. It is, however, equally true if we add: Canon Law
is also particularly close to Natural Law because of its
eminent stability and uncompromising firmness where the
absolute moral truth is in question, i.e. where the highest
degree of evidence of right reason has been reached and
there is no longer a question of "finding" what is conformable to Natural Law, but of accepting the order of
Natural Law that is known without legislative determination. The ecclesiastical lawgiver cannot change anything
in the essential properties of institutions that are connatural to Man as man: in conforming to truth there is
no question of "progressive" or "conservative" but only
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of right or wrong stands. The position of Canon Law on
the unity and indissolubility of marriage is a case in point.
In the union of sexes the fundamental distinction betwen
the institution of marriage and the instinct of mating, is,
quite apart from revelation, the "rule and measure of
reason." It is because of a rational grasp of the "logique
de l'institution," of the givenness of the family as the cell
of society, and not because of conservatism, that Catholic
doctrine on marriage as such, and hence Canon Law, does
not yield to the specious rationalism that would assimilate
the contracting of marriage to any other contract that
might be terminated at will (in the terms of St. Thomas,
this would run counter to a first principle) or for cause
(this would be against a secondary precept). There are
a number of valid reasons of natural justice that demand
the right to discontinue an unbearable community of bed
and board: nobody has yet been able to show how in the
natural order these reasons could cover up the desire of
passion to replace the consummated bond by a "happier"
one.
That much may be conceded that in no other field of
human acts does reason have so hard a stand against the
fallacious rationalizations of elementary urges, or finds itself in a greater psychological need of supranatural help,
as in the relation betwen man and woman. Canon Law
has the invaluable advantage of seeing, in the light of
faith, the natural properties of marriage re-enforced and
heightened, on the sacramental level, by positive divine
law. The principle that revelation cannot contradict, but
only perfect the natural order of creation means not only
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that Natural Law continues undisrupted in the sacramental marriage (e.g. in the legitimacy of children from
putative marriages; in the absolute value of the interior
act of the will for the validity of the marriage consent)
but also that the judgment of vulnerable, natural reason
is strengthened to attain an absolute degree of knowing
the dictate of Natural Law.
IV-

Natural Law Terminology in the

Code of Canon Law
14.-The interpenetration of the natural, the supranatural, and the positive order, so impressively set forth
in the institution of Christian marriage, actually underlies
the Code in its entirety. It is of relatively small interest
where and when Natural Law is expressly mentioned in
the Code. Since the essential foundations of Canon Law
on divine (positive and natural) law is an axiomatic truth,
there is, strictly speaking, no need to mention it at all in
positive legislation, the more so since the Code professes
at its outset 29 that rules of Natural Law and positive divine law remain valid whether expressly restated or not.
It has therefore only the secondary significance of cautioning against possible misunderstandings when elsewhere it is said in particular that no custom can prevail
against divine law, positive or natural ;30 that there can be
no prescription (adverse possession or statute of limitations) against rights that exist by Natural Law or posiCan. 6 n.6.
3o Can. 27.
29
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tive divine law;31 or that in the matter of contracts or of
settlements (in and out of court) the Church follows the
secular law of the respective countries except where such
law is contrary to Natural Law or positive divine law (or
where Canon Law positively rules otherwise).32 All these
restrictive clauses are self-evident on the principle of
"non-contradiction": man-made law ceases to be law
where it would violate Natural Law, which is always understood without having to be stated. The Code does not
mention, for instance, the cessation of law in the case of
epikeia.
15.-Similarly, it is evident and needs no restatement
by the legislator that ecclesiastical authority cannot dispense from what Natural Law prohibits. The matter is of
great practical importance in regard to marriage impediments, of which some, but not all, have their origin merely in the authority of the Church to impose reasonable
restrictions on the freedom to marry. The Code terms
only impotence as an impediment of Natural Law, but
does not use Natural Law terminology in regard to the
impediment of the consummated bond nor for even the
nearest degree of kindred. 33 Yet it is not the terminology of
the canons which determines the character of the impediment; and while the Church has wisely reserved to the
supreme magisterium (of the Pope alone or the Ecumenical Council) the power to issue an authentic declaration
whether a given marriage impediment has its origin in
1509 n.1.
Can. 1529, can. 1926.

sCan.
32
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divine law (natural or positive) U-in this connection one
may remember the disastrous consequences of Henry
VIII's case-the Code is certainly far from intending to
say that impotence is the only impediment of Natural
Law.
16.-It is the same with Natural Law and the exercise
of personal rights. What is allowed by positive law ceases
to be allowed where the exercise of a right runs counter
to Natural Law. Only one such case is expressly stated
in the Code: when permission is granted by ecclesiastical
authority to read prohibited books, the person remains
bound by natural law, i.e. the natural moral obligation
to avoid books which for him constitute a proximate spiritual danger. 35 This decision in conscience (a counterpart
of epikeia) is mentioned by the legislator; but the same
principle is understood where it is not mentioned in regard to other rights. A traveler, e.g., is not bound to observe local laws made for the territory in which he temporarily sojourns: clearly the traveler's right ceases not
only where the positive common law so declares, 8 but
also by Natural Law; notably, if by exercising his right he
would cause genuine scandal, i.e., cause others to sin.
17.-Sometimes the legislator refers to Natural Law
in order to stress the gravity of an existing obligation, e.g.
8
34
85
36
order

Canons 1068, 1069, 1076.
Can. 1038.
Can. 1405.
Can. 14 n.2: in the case of local laws made for reasons of public
or determining the solemnities of acts.
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in the statement that the right to denounce a crime to the
proper ecclesiastical authorities becomes a duty of Natural Law where faith, religion, and the common good of
the Church are in danger, or where, quite generally, a
grave public evil threatehs. 37 The emphasis on Natural
Law will serve here the purpose to dispel a hesitancy that
often may arise from the instinctive aversion against becoming an informer. But all other duties by which an
individual is bound to act so as to avert danger to the
common good are equally of Natural Law without being
expressly so stated: in denial of justice, e.g., the judge
violates not only the positive law of the judicial office, but
Natural Law as well.
18.-Natural Law finally is mentioned twice with regard to the acquisitionof temporal goods: the Code states
that, as to the mode of acquiring property, every just title
of Natural or Positive Law that is valid for others is also
valid for the Church;38 secondly, that every one who by
natural or ecclesiastical law is capable of disposing of his
property can make a will or gift in favor of a pious
cause.39 In the first case, the Code does not speak of the
Natural Law problem of property as such, but merely
adopts an old distinction current in the schools, namely
that some titles to property would exist "by the nature of
things" without any positive legislation (occupation, fruits
of labor or productive property, etc.) -which does not
37

Can. 1935

38 Can. 1499.
3a Can. 1513.

§

2.
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mean to say that these are absolute, "indestructible" titles
withdrawn from the authority of restricting legislation;
the Natural Law terminology is used here simply to include every possible just mode in which every one can
acquire property. 40 In the other instance, reference to
the capacity by Natural Law to dispose of one's property
is not meant to state an "inalienable" right of disposing
by will or gift, or of having one's will executed; it is only
a reference to the natural limits of the capacity to posit
acts-in-law, namely the use of reason: within these limits,
possible restrictions of the freedom of disposal will be considered only when they are established by Canon Law
(e.g. in minors and religious) while restrictions by state
laws leave the canonical validity of the disposition untouched. 4 1 Again, the Natural Law terminology is strictly speaking not necessary (in other contexts, where the
use of reason as the basic requirement for the capacity of
physical persons to legal acts is dealt with, it is not expressly termed as being of Natural Law) : but in this particular instance the emphasis serves to dispel possible
misunderstandings. It should be stressed, however, that in
the two texts on titles of acquisition and on pious gifts,
the question is not that of the unabridgeable, fundamental right of the Church to own and acquire temporal goods.
For, this right, although it may be argued to some extent
on a Natural Law basis, is actually founded in the positive divine institution of the Church: Natural Law can
410 Cf.

Wernz-Vidal, Jus canonicuw IV.2 (Rome 1935) 202.

41 Cf. J. D. Hannan, The Canon Law of Wills

123ff; Wernz-Vidal, op. cit. 274, 824.

(Washington 1934)

116

NATURAL

LAW INSTITUTE

PROCEEDINGS

only show that the Church (as a human society) cannot
have less property rights than other societies; the existence of her property rights as independent from the au42
thority of the state goes beyond the Natural Law.

19.-This rapid review of express mentions of Natural
Law in the Code may suffice to formulate the following
conclusion: by referring occasionally, for purposes of
stress and clarification, to Natural Law principles in given
contexts, the legislator does not intend to draw up a
"Code of Natural Law." The references are and remain
quite frankly selective. It is rather in its fundamental
position to the philosophy of Natural Law, and in its constant effort to remain "open to" the guidance and normative force of Natural Law on every level of legislative and
jurisdictional activity-be it concerned with the social or
the spiritual ends of ecclesiastical society; in a word, it is
in the spirit of the legal order of the Church that the
functioning of Natural Law must be grasped. To have
demonstrated that the natural, created, order of right
reason is necessarily presupposed by, and persists within
the unique framework of a society that rests on a supranatural foundation-this is perhaps the greatest contribution of Canon Law to the doctrine of Natural Law.

42 Can. 1495 § 1 speaks of "congenital right" (ius nativum). Cf. J. A.
Goodwine, The Right of the Church to Acquire Property (Washington
1941) 6ff., 28ff., 99.
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I shall not presume to discourse on this subject as an
authority on law. I speak merely as a witness to some
aspects of its relation to the work in which all nations
and all men of good will are now engaged - the work
of establishing a just order in the world under which
mankind can live in peace, freedom and security.
Together with many able and unselfish men from all
over the world, I have been associated with this task continuously since the United Nations was organized in San
Francisco in 1945. From the experience and the lessons
of the past four years, I have drawn some conclusions
which I hope will cast a little more light on the problem
before us.
To my mind, the most important lesson which the
work of the United Nations has taught us is the realization that we cannot have lasting peace in the world until
we have established a system of just law which shall be
universally accepted and applied. By just law I mean
law based on reason, consonant with the essential requirements of man's nature and deriving ultimate sanction from the source of all authority, God Himself. I
119
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reject as inimical to peace that false law which, recognizing no higher sanction than the authority of the State,
has produced regimentation in lieu of order, total tyranny
in lieu of freedom and class war rather than harmony
and peace in human society.
It is perhaps premature to say that the nations are
now fully aware of the need to make international law
conform to natural law as the only basis for stability and
order in modem society. We live in an age permeated
with the spirit of secularism and it is not often that we
find even the leaders of Christian States publicly professing their faith in the moral principles upon which
the structure of the peace we are trying to build must
rest. If we should examine the work of the United Nations, however, we shall find in its most significant acts
and accomplishments a definite tendency to make international law conform to natural law.
The concept of peace based on just law is implicit in
the United Nations Charter itself. The solemn pledge
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war" is followed by a declaration of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person [and] in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small." It is on this
basis that the member States propose, in the words of
the Charter, "to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained,"
and to undertake "to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom."
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We discern in the Charter's avowal of faith in human
rights and in the dignity of the human person the Christian belief in a brotherhood of men equally precious in
the eyes of God, each deserving of His justice and worthy
of His love, a belief which lies at the root of all our
traditions of equality among men and nations.
In Paris last December, the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The preamble of the
Declaration begins with the recognition of the inherent
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the true foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. The whole of this
historic document is devoted to the precise definition of
the rights of man which, flowing as they do from his
very nature, are recognized as beyond the power of any
human authority to deny, annul or violate. Of all the
acts of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights has demonstrated most clearly the tendency about which I have already remarked, the tendency to work out a system of international law conforming as closely as possible to natural law.
It is true that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as it now stands does not have the force of law.
It is but an affirmation of the essential rights with which
man has been endowed by his Creator. But the Declaration carries the signatures of forty-eight states and their
approval invests it with a moral force never before
acquired by any proclamation of the same nature. For
the first time in history, the fundamental rights of man
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have been formally recognized in a joint declaration by
the great majority of the nations that make up the world
community.
An International Covenant on Human Rights is now
being formulated in order to give legal sanction to the
principles embodied in the Declaration. When it is finally approved, the Covenant will make respect for the
essential human rights legally binding upon the signatory
states. A suitable machinery for implementation will
then be created. Unless there is a radical change in the
development of the United Nations, we may confidently
look forward to seeing the Covenant become part of the
growing body of international law without which we
cannot hope to establish a stable and enduring peace.
The International Convention on Genocide, which was
also adopted by the General Assembly last year, is a
positive contribution of the first importance to international law. It will come into force ninety days after
twenty states shall have ratified it. The Convention, also
for the first time in history, makes genocide, one of the
most heinous crimes against nature, punishable under international law. It binds the contracting states to pass
the legislation necessary to give effect to its provisions
and envisages trial by an international penal tribunal in
case the contracting parties should agree to establish one
and should accept its jurisdiction.
If there should be any dispute between states regarding
the interpretation or application of any of the articles of
the Convention, the International Court of Justice, itself
an outgrowth of the evolving system of international law,
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may act on the case at the request of any of the parties
to the dispute. The Convention also provides that any
of the contracting parties may bring a charge of genocide
before the competent organs of the United Nations with
the request that appropriate action be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
In the course of the debate on the Convention, the
Assembly foresaw the increasing need of the international
community for an international judicial organ which
will be empowered to try certain crimes. Accordingly,
it adopted a resolution instructing the International Law
Commission to study the feasibility of setting up such an
international judicial organ exclusively for the trial of
persons charged with genocide and other crimes which
may be placed under its jurisdiction by international conventions. In carrying out this task, the International Law
Commission was requested by the Assembly to look into
the alternative possibility of establishing a criminal
chamber of the International Court of Justice. Not content with formulating the law, the Assembly has taken
measures to insure its effective enforcement.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved without opposition. The International Convention on Genocide was adopted unanimously. I consider
the agreement reached by the nations on these two historic acts as among the most hopeful auguries of future
peace.
The contributions of the United Nations to international law extend to every important field of human activity. Last May the General Assembly adopted a con-
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vention on the International Transmission of News and
the Right of Correction. Last week the Assembly approved the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic
in Persons and of the Exploitation and Prostitution of
Others. The Economic and Social Council and its agencies are carrying on extensive operations in the fields of
health, education, trade, labor, economic development
and relief of the homeless, the suffering and the needy.
All these activities have been undertaken in accordance
with the Charter and other international agreements
that now constitute part of the law of nations.
The present session of the General Assembly has produced an unprecedented decision. Under the Charter,
the power to make binding decisions on matters affecting
international peace and security is granted to the Security Council alone; the General Assembly can only
make recommendations. In the case of the former Italian colonies, however, the powers concerned-the United
States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom- made a prior commitment to abide by the Assembly's decision. In consequence of this agreement, the
Assembly's disposition of the former Italian colonies is
legally binding and assumes the nature of international
legislation. The Assembly resolution in 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine also acquired legal force
when it was enforced by the Security Council.
The work of the Trusteeship Council is largely an
attempt to help nonself-governing peoples to achieve
their right to independence through a process of planned
and orderly change. The recommendations of the Coun-
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cil in behalf of the social, political and economic welfare
of dependent peoples lack legal force but are so firmly
grounded on moral principle that they command the
support of the great majority of the member states of
the United Nations. Although the states administering
the trust territories are not under legal compulsion to
carry out the Council's recommendations, they are nevertheless impelled by the force of world opinion to conform to them in practice. The right of nonself-governing
peoples to freedom and self-determination is now securely established. The work of the trusteeship Council is
bringing its realization steadily forward.
In its anxiety to assist the progressive development of
international law and to facilitate its codification, the
General Assembly in 1947 instructed the International
Law Commission to prepare a Draft Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of States. This Draft Declaration
was presented to the Assembly during the current session
and the Assembly voted to transmit it to the member
States for consideration. A new draft will be prepared
next year taking into account their comments, criticisms
and suggestions. In formulating the Declaration submitted to the Assembly, the International Law Commission was guided by the realization that international
peace and security, the primary aim of the United Nations, cannot be established except under the reign of
law and justice.
This of course is not a new concept. The necessity for
some kind of international law and order is as old as the
nations. What is new and without precedent is the ex-
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treme urgency of our need and the fact that we can no
longer afford the luxury of error in our interpretation
and application of just law in international relations. In
the past, when the breakdown of law resulted in war
among the nations, the limited power of the weapons at
his disposal gave man a margin of safety. In this day of
atomic bombs, bacteriological weapons and supersonic
planes, that margin of safety has all but disappeared.
We can no longer permit the breakdown of law without
endangering our very existence.
Some time ago, in a public address, I ventured the
opinion that the destructive power of modem technology
has made war obsolete and is driving us, almost in spite
of ourselves, to the realization that some form of Christian order may be the only salvation of our way of life.
Calling to mind the development in the United Nations
of a system of international law deriving from and conforming to the natural law, I remarked that we may yet
find ourselves confronted by the seeming paradox of
Christianity emerging as the only practical program for
lasting peace and equitable order in our troubled world.
I quoted G. K. Chesterton, who, if I remember correctly, had once declared that the trouble with Christianity is not that it has failed but that it has never been
tried. And I pointed out that in our search for a peace
that would endure and a rule of law that would insure
freedom and equality for all men and nations, we have
tried nearly everything else, and, having failed, are now
turning in desperation, almost unconsciously, to the
neglected tenets of our Christian faith.
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When we say, for instance, that peace is indivisible,
we mean that such is the interdependence of nations today that war in any part of the world will, by an inevitable process of chain reaction, affect the security of
even those countries which are geographically remote
from the scene of battle. By the same token, freedom
has no frontiers; it is co-extensive with the human race.
Any attack upon the independence of any nation is a
threat to the independence of all; the denial or suppression of the rights and liberties of any people diminishes
the freedom of all mankind. As with peace and freedom,
so with economic well-being.
This is just another way of saying that beneath its
manifold diversity of race, culture and nationality, and
despite the deep divisions in its ranks caused by conflicting interests, ideologies and ambitions, such is the essential solidarity, the integral, organic unity of the human
family that no member may be injured without causing
injury to the whole. Surely we may perceive in this
awareness of the basic and inescapable oneness of the
world, of the inherent and irrevocable inter-relation of
men and nations, a reflection of the Christian concept of
human brotherhood, an image, discerned as through a
dark glass, of the Mystical Body.
This realization, as I have indicated, is implicit in the
Charter and in the work of the United Nations. The
entire range of United Nations activities in the economic
and social fields constitutes an organized attempt to protect the rights, secure the freedoms and promote the
well-being of the world as a whole. Nothing less is under-
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taken because nothing less will suffice. A declaration of
human rights is meaningless unless it is universal. A
convention on genocide is inadequate if it does not apply
to all nations. Problems of health, labor, commerce,
science, culture and reconstruction may be considered in
terms of national or regional requirements, but always in
relation to the universal welfare. And rightly so, for in
the present state of the world nothing short of justice for
all nations, equality for all men and freedom for all
peoples - precepts deriving directly or by implication
from Christian doctrine - can save humanity from a
condition of permanent conffict leading inexorably to
another war.
In this sense, may we not say that the practical application of Christian teaching in international relations
has become a condition for the attainment of world
peace and security? And considering the power for annihilation latent in the new weapons of war, may we not
go even further and say that faithful adherence to Christian doctrine and the law of God has become a sine qua
non of the survival of mankind?

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

The Natural Law Institute Library
At the conclusion of the 1949 sessions of the Natural
Law Institute, the University of Notre Dame announced
that a special Library for further study and research in
the field of Natural Law philosophy and jurisprudence
would be established in the College of Law.
The Library is the generous gift of Mr. Alvin A.
Gould, of Cincinnati, Ohio, sponsor of the 1948 and
1949 Natural Law Institutes. The Library will be
located on the second floor of the College of Law building. It is planned to bring together in one place a complete and thoroughly representative collection of books
and materials relating to Natural Law. This collection
will thus be readily available to scholars and students
who are interested in the history and meaning of the
Natural Law and its adequate restatement in the light
of present day problems.
Following the Natural Law Institute sessions of 1948,
a Committee consisting of Professor Maurice Le Bel,
Laval University, Quebec, Dr. Ernst Levy, University
of Washington, Seattle, Dr. Gordon Gerould, Princeton
University, Dr. Heinrich Rommen, St. Thomas College,
St. Paul, and Honorable Robert N. Wilkin, Judge of the
United States District Court, Cleveland, Ohio, agreed to
act in an advisory capacity in the preparation of a tentative list of titles to be included in the initial collection of
the Natural Law Institute Library. The list which fol131
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lows has been prepared by the Committee and sent to
leading American Law Schools and to distinguished
authorities on the Natural Law for critical advice. It
is hoped that the initial collection will be ready for use
this year.
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